

## More on the Emergence of Prenominal Unaccusative Past Participles in the History of English

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The aim of this paper is to explain how English unaccusative past participles became available as prenominal modifiers (henceforth, prenominal unaccusative participles). First, I will sort out the types of unaccusative verbs on the basis of Levin and Rappaport's (1995) discussion, as regards their formation of prenominal participles. Then, based on Chigchi's (2015) close examination of data from Visser (1963) and thorough investigation of the historical corpora listed below and of Oxford English Dictionary (OED), I will make a modification to Chigchi's (2015) account, providing a more in-depth analysis of what brought about the emergence of prenominal unaccusative participles.

In Present-day English (PDE), all the types of past (passive) participle as shown below can appear in prenominal position.

- (1) a. *murdered people* (transitive participle)
- b. *melted cheese* (ergative participle)
- c. *fallen leaves* (unaccusative participle)

Transitive participles like (1a) and ergative participles like (1b) have been available as prenominal modifiers since Old English (OE), with the latter increasing throughout Middle English (ME) and early Modern English (EModE), while prenominal unaccusative participles like (1c) began to frequently appear in EModE. Visser (1963: 1227ff.) provides a list of prenominal participles based on intransitive verbs, but a careful examination of the relevant examples reveals that few of the OE and ME participles listed there qualify as unaccusative participles, while most of the Modern English (ModE) participles do. Moreover, Chigchi's (2015) investigation utilizing the quotation search function of OED shows that 22 out of the 54 PDE unaccusative verbs examined have been attested as prenominal participles only after the 16th century. The result of Chigchi's (2015) investigation of the historical corpora, summarized below, also indicates that prenominal unaccusative participles were not found until EModE.

Table1. The distribution of the (first) occurrences of prenominal transitive participles

Period	OE	M1	M2	M3	M4	E1	E2	E3	L1	L2	L3
Token	1561	172	88	406	403	224	373	405	347	441	412
Type	274	96	15	75	39	78	114	141	111	120	112

Table2. The distribution of the (first) occurrences of prenominal unaccusative participles

Period	OE	M1	M2	M3	M4	E1	E2	E3	L1	L2	L3
Token	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	13	5	18	8
Type	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	1	1	4	0

\* 'Token' here refers to the total number of participles attested (in each sub-period) and 'type' refers to the number of distinct lexemes (or base verbs).

Chigchi (2015) argues that the emergence of unaccusative participles was due to a change in the licensing condition on the formation of prenominal participles from ‘the base verb must be a transitive verb (in ME)’ to ‘the base verb must be a theme assigner (in EModE)’. His analysis, however, fails to explain why a few intransitive participles were attested in ME. I follow Chigchi (2015), on the one hand, in claiming that the availability of unaccusative participles as prenominal modifiers is ascribed to the fact that a large number of ergative verbs increasingly emerged throughout ME and EModE. On the other hand, however, I will here argue that the licensing condition changed, at some point in ME, from ‘the base verb must be an affectedness assigner’ to ‘the base verb must bear an internal argument’. Assuming that aspectual prefixes expressed the total affectedness on the object of a transitive verb (Elenbaas (2007: 117ff.)) and that it is such a notion of affectedness that licensed prenominal participles, it is reasonable to argue that affectedness came to be expressed by transitive verbs after the loss of those prefixes in ME, so that ergative verbs under their *causative* transitive variants would easily form prenominal participles, assigning affectedness to the modified noun as their internal argument. Note, however, that ergative verbs have both causative transitive and unaccusative intransitive variants, each occurring with the modified noun interpreted as their internal argument, much as in the case of unaccusative verbs. It then follows that when ergativity was established with a given verb, its participle as a prenominal modifier would be ambiguous in interpretation between two different formations, one based on the causative transitive variant and another based on the unaccusative intransitive variant. As long as the formation based on the unaccusative intransitive variant came to be a possible interpretation, which could be due to the increasing emergence of ergative verbs, it would become possible for unaccusative participles to appear in prenominal position, by analogy.

**Selected references:** Chigchi, Bai (2015) “Eigoshi-ni okeru Meishizenyishushoku-no Hitaikaku Kakobunshi-no Shutsugen-ni tsuite” (On the Emergence of Prenominal Unaccusative Past Participles in the History of English); Elenbaas, Marion (2007) *The Synchronic and Diachronic Syntax of the English Verb-particle Combination*; Levin, Beth and M. Rappaport, Hovav (1995) *Unaccusativity: At the Syntax-lexical Semantics Interface*; Simpson, John A. and Edmund S. C. Weiner, prepared (1989) *The Oxford English Dictionary*, Second Edition on CD-ROM Version 3.0 (2002); Visser, Fredericus Th (1963) *An Historical Syntax of the English Language*, Part One.

**Corpora:** Kroch, Anthony and Ann Taylor (2000) *The Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Middle English 2nd Edition*; Kroch, Anthony, Beatrice Santorini and Ariel Diertani (2010) *Penn Parsed Corpus of Modern British English*; Kroch, Anthony, Beatrice Santorini and Lauren Delfs (2004) *The Penn-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Early Modern English*; Taylor, Ann, Anthony Warner, Susan Pintzuk and Frank Beths (2003) *The York-Toronto-Helsinki Parsed Corpus of Old English Prose*.

## Successive cyclic *wh*-movement without successive cyclic crashing

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Chomsky (2013, 2015) discusses two sets of shared prominent features: (i)  $\phi$  for subject N and predicate T, (ii)  $\phi$  for object N and root R, and (iii) Q for a *wh*-expression and interrogative C<sub>Q</sub>. When extending the labeling analysis to copular constructions (e.g., XP copula {XP, YP}, see Moro (2000)), Chomsky (2013) notes "[m]ere matching of most prominent features does not suffice" and suggests "[w]hat is required is not just matching but actual agreement, a stronger relation, which holds in the indirect question and subject-predicate examples but not small clauses." Following Chomsky, we assume that matching of those prominent features is not enough; they must agree via valuation, meaning one values the other.

Under this assumption, if features are to count as a label, then valuation must hold between the two heads X and Y of {XP, YP}. Between N and T/R, it is generally accepted that unvalued  $\phi$  on T/R gets valued by agreeing with inherently valued  $\phi$  on N. But what about the *wh*-question case? Chomsky (2013, 2015) proposes that conversely it is the (c-commanding) interrogative C<sub>Q</sub> that values uQ on a *wh*-expression. Important evidence that interrogative C<sub>Q</sub> values uQ on the relevant *wh*-expression comes from Japanese. Saito (2013) argues that a *wh*-expression is an operator without specific quantificational force, and its quantificational force gets determined by its associated C<sub>Q</sub> particles such as *ka* and *mo*, as illustrated in (1a,b), respectively:

- (1) a. Taroo-wa [[Hanako-ga nani-o tabeta] ka] sitteiru  
Taroo-Top Hanako-Nom what-Acc ate Q know  
'Taroo knows what Hanako ate.'
- b. [[Nani-o tabeta hito] mo] manzokusita  
what-Acc ate person also was.satisfied  
'For every x, x a thing, the person that ate x was satisfied.'

Saito proposes that in (1a), the disjunctive meaning of the particle *ka* turns the *wh*-expression *nani* 'what' into a *wh*-quantifier, whereas in (1b), the conjunctive meaning of the particle *mo* turns the *wh*-expression *nani* 'what' into a universal quantifier. Extending Saito's analysis of (1a,b) to English, we expect a particular C<sub>Q</sub>'s valuation of uQ on a *wh*-expression to affect or determine aspects of the interpretation of that *wh*-expression. That is, the unvalued Quantifier feature (uQ) on a *wh*-expression gets valued by some inherent property borne by the interrogative C<sub>Q</sub>, as argued by Chomsky (2013, 2015), and corroborated for Japanese by Saito (2013).

However, the analysis that interrogative C<sub>Q</sub> values uQ on a *wh*-expression resurrects a long-standing problem concerning the status of uQ at lower phase levels. Recall that Chomsky (2007, 2008) eliminated the unvalued features postulated to implement *wh*-movement (e.g., [uQ], [uWh], see Chomsky 2000). Chomsky (2008) noted that "[w]e need not postulate an uninterpretable feature that induces movement, and can thus overcome a long-standing problem about crash at the lower phase levels in successive-cyclic movement." The long-standing problem is that uQ on a *wh*-expression necessarily gets transferred at the lower phase levels, as in e.g. "Which dog do you think the boy likes?" (see Epstein 2007 for detailed discussion). If unvalued features are intolerable to the interface systems, then the presence of uQ at the lower phase levels should induce a serious problem (but see Epstein and

Seely 2006 for an alternative analysis).

A solution we would like to suggest here is that uQ on a *wh*-expression is tolerable to the interface systems i.e. its appearance does not induce crash. First, one crucial difference between uPhi on T/R and uQ on *wh*-expression is that uPhi on T/R should not appear at CI regardless of whether it gets valued or not, whereas uQ on a *wh*-expression should appear at CI after it gets valued (crucially to capture the types of semantic interpretations noted in e.g. (1a,b)). That is, uPhi is a [-CI] feature, whereas uQ is a [+CI] feature (in the sense of Epstein et al. 2010), and we suggest that the latter, but not the former, is tolerable (even if unvalued) to the interface systems, i.e., the appearance of uQ at CI does not induce crash. On the path to the SM interface systems, uQ, being [+CI], must be deleted, just like any other [+CI] features. On the path to the CI interface systems, uQ, being [+CI], remains. So, what can we say about the status of uQ at the lower phase levels? Given that uQ means unvalued Q(uantification), we propose that a *wh*-expression bearing uQ is interpreted as a variable, and as such it does not induce crash when it is sent to the CI interface at the lower phase levels. It is a legitimate CI object in and of itself. By contrast, a free variable is a gibberish problem, not a crash problem (since crash concerns only the legitimacy of individual features (or bundles of features), not coherence, see Epstein et al. 2010). What is important is whether it will be bound by C<sub>Q</sub> later in the derivation. When a *wh*-expression bearing uQ moves to a higher position, and it gets valued, and that information is sent to the CI interface systems, that is the point where this lower copy of *wh*-expression bearing uQ becomes a bound variable. The phenomenon of successive cyclic *wh*-movement is in fact unbounded, like binding condition C effects. Phasally speaking, we could say that the CI systems start interpreting materials as they come in, but elements like variables, phase internally unbound, are set aside, and the CI interface systems wait for further information. If the relevant information comes in, great; if not, then gibberish.

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## Japanese postverbal elements: movement vs. no movement

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In colloquial speech Japanese allows elements to appear postverbally. It is also known that postverbal elements optionally omit (Case) markers, as in (1) (Endo 1996, Takita 2014, a.o.).

- (1) kodomo-ga yonda-yo, kono hon (-o).  
child-Nom read-Prt this book-ACC  
'(lit.) A child read, this book.'

Much debate has focused on whether postverbal elements in SOV languages are derived via movement, compatible with the Linear Correspondence Axiom proposed by Kayne (1994). This paper argues that the postverbal DP in (1) itself undergoes no movement, in line with Takita (2014). However, apart from him it analyses the construction as a cleft with deletion.

Following Taguchi (2009), Takita (2014) argues that a right-dislocated DP without a marker is a topic in a single clause while the remaining undergo leftward movement. Thus the DP with no marker does not induce an extraction violation in the coordination construction and islands. In contrast, Takita (2011, 2014) maintains that dislocation involves clausal movement when the dislocated element is accompanied with Case-markers. Takita's two analyses are in (2a,b).

- (2) a. [ ... ]<sub>i</sub> [Bare Topic  $t_i$ ] (with no Case marker, monoclausal)  
b. [Clause1 ...] [Clause2 [  $t_i$  ]<sub>j</sub> XP-marker<sub>i</sub>  $t_j$ ...] (with a Case marker, biclausal)

Despite of the presence/absence of a marker, however, insertion of a copula (along with the second occurrence of the same verbs) is grammatical in (3), in favor of a biclausal analysis.

- (3) kodomo-ga yonda-yo, kono hon (-o) (da-yo/yonda-yo).  
child-Nom read-Prt this book-ACC Cop-Prt/read-Prt  
'(lit.) A child read, this book (is/read).'

Moreover, a wh-word is possible in the postverbal domain in (4) (Kuno 1978, a.o.), which is likewise problematic to (2a) since a wh-word is a focus, not "old" information (Partee 1991).

- (4) kodomo-ga yonda-no, **nan(i)/dono hon (-o)** (na-no/yonda-no).  
child-Nom read-Q what/which book-Acc Cop-Q/read-Q  
'(lit.) child read?, what/which book is/read?'

The examples indicate that the dislocated DP lies in a biclausal structure as a focus (not a topic).

I propose that the construction with/without a Case marker is biclausal. Clause2 is the a simplex or (pseudo-)cleft construction in (5a,b) with the schema in (5c), where everything but the focused XP may be deleted.

- (5) a. kodomo-ga yonda-yo, [Clause2 (sore-wa) kono hon (-o) (da-yo)].  
child-Nom read-Prt that-Top this book-ACC Cop-Prt  
'(lit.) A child read, (that is) this book.'  
b. kodomo-ga yonda-yo, [Clause2 (kodomo-ga yonda-no-wa) kono hon (-o) (da-yo)].  
child-Nom read-Prt child-Nom read-Prt-Top this book-ACC Cop-Prt  
'(lit.) A child read, (it is) this book (which the child read).'
- c. ... [Clause2 ([DP subject-wa]/[(pseud-)cleft...-no-wa]) XP(-marker) (Cop)]

Given the analysis in (5c), the seemingly optional marker comes from the distinct properties of the (pseudo-)cleft constructions, as Hiraiwa & Ishihara (2012:145) argue in (6).

- (6) a. [Naoya-ga tabeta no]-wa ringo-o mit-tui da. Cleft  
 Naoya-Nom ate Prt-Top apple-acc 3-Cl Cop  
 'It was three apples that Naoya ate.'  
 b. [Naoya-ga tabeta no]-wa ringo-Ø mit-tui da.  
 Naoya-Nom ate Prt-Top apple 3-Cl Cop  
 'What Naoya ate was three apples.' Pseudo-cleft.

Hiraiwa & Ishihara argue that the cleft requires the Case marker while the pseudo cleft allows its omission. Given the distinction, the optionality of the marker in (1) is attributed to the distinct properties of the two cleft constructions.

Furthermore, according to Hiraiwa & Ishihara (2012: 145), clefts allow multiple foci, unlike pseudo-clefts. With this in mind, consider the right-dislocation with/without the markers in (7).

- (7) a. kodomo-ga ageta-yo [tomodachi-ni ringo-o mit-tu (da-yo)].  
 child-Nom gave-Prt child-to apple-Acc 3-Cl Cop-Prt  
 '(lit.) child gave, to a friend, three apples'.  
 b. \*kodomo-ga ageta-yo [tomodachi-Ø ringo-Ø mit-tu (da-yo)].  
 child-Nom gave-Prt child-to apple-Acc 3-Cl Cop-Prt

The sentences involve the multiple elements postverbally. The postverbal DP with the marker in (7a) is grammatical. On the other hand, the DP without the marker in (7b) is ungrammatical. This distinction is also compatible with Hiraiwa & Ishihara's analysis of (pseudo)clefts.

Furthermore the current analysis with/without (pseudo-)clefts accounts for the presence/absence of the island effects mentioned previously. Hiraiwa & Ishihara (2012) argue that movement is involved in clefts (which prohibit the omission of the markers). This explains why the postverbal DP with the marker in (pseudo-)clefts shows an island violation, unlike in the simplex construction, shown in (5c).

The current paper investigates Japanese right dislocation of a DP with/without the accusative Case marker. In line with Takita (2014), the present paper argues that the postverbal element itself does not undergoes movement. However apart from him, it argues that the right-dislocated element(s) is/are focused in a biclausal + deletion analysis rather than a topics analysis. Moreover the second clause is a simplex or complex (pseudo)cleft construction. Hence, (i) the focus reading, (ii) the presence/absence of the Case marker and (iii) that of island effects are readily accounted for without appealing to leftward movement as in (2b).

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## A Relabeling-Analysis of English Possessives

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English possessive DPs have been widely studied; e.g., see Bernstein and Tortora (B&R) (2005), Barker (1998), and references therein. Genitive possessive pronoun constructions in English are partially irregular, as exemplified in (1). Note that *of*-insertion is regular but there is variation in the deployment of the double genitive.

- (1) a. my friend/the friend of mine/\*the friend of mine's  
b. your friend/\*the friend of your/the friend of yours  
c. his friend/the friend of his/\*the friend of his'(s)  
d. her friend/\*the friend of her/the friend of hers  
e. their friend/\*the friend of their/the friend of theirs

We propose an account in the recent Minimalist framework of Chomsky (2013), extending Cechetto and Donati's (C&D) (2015) relabeling proposal for relative clauses.

In C&D, the term "relabeling" specifically refers to internal Merge of a noun to relabel a clause as a nominal, e.g. as in the free relative interpretation of "what you bought" in "I like what you bought", cf. "I wonder what you bought". (Chomsky's framework permits either  $\alpha$  or  $\beta$  to contribute the label of  $\{\alpha, \beta\}$  when two syntactic objects  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  Merge.) We propose that a PP is the target of relabeling in the relevant possessive pronoun examples in (1).

Our proposed structures are given in (2-6). We adopt a standard analysis of the DP in (2). In (2b), the determiner *the* bears unvalued Case (uCase) and labels the resulting phrase when Merged with the nominal *friend*. (We use DP, rather than D, for clarity of exposition, and assume Case is visible at the DP level.) We propose that (3a) receives the derivation shown in (3b-e). In (3b), following Chomsky (1986), we assume 's is a relational determiner that allows a DP to be Merged to its edge, cf. *John's friend*; also, 's values Case for the edge DP, with strikethrough marking valued Case. In (3c), the preposition *of* Merges and values Case for the complement DP, followed by internal Merge of *friend* – the relabeling step in (3d). We assume Merge is free; the impossibility of (4a) is predicted as the nominal *friend* in (4b) cannot value Case for DP *his friend*. In (3e), *the* is externally Merged, and we assume that an irregular spellout rule produces *his* from *he*+*'s*. In the regular case, e.g. *John's* in (5a) – assuming the derivation in (5b), the default rule for 's invokes no spellout change. However, as the data in (1) indicates, the presence of the pronominal double genitive cannot be predicted either syntactically or phonologically (see B&R). As pronouns are high-frequency words, we assume context-sensitive word-specific spellout rules override the generic rule to produce *hers* from *she*+*'s*, (also *yours* and *theirs*) but *mine* from *I*+*'s* (cf. \**mine's*). Spellout context-sensitivity is required to distinguish (6a) from (6b); i.e. the rule for pronoun+'s must take into account whether or not the complement of 's is a copy.

- (2) a. the friend  
b. [<sub>DP</sub> [<sub>D</sub> the] [<sub>N</sub> friend]]<sub>uCase</sub>
- (3) a. the friend of his  
b. [<sub>DP</sub> [<sub>DP</sub> he]<sub>uCase</sub> [<sub>D</sub> 's] [<sub>N</sub> friend]]<sub>uCase</sub>  
c. [<sub>PP</sub> [<sub>P</sub> of] [<sub>DP</sub> [<sub>DP</sub> he] [<sub>D</sub> 's] [<sub>N</sub> friend]]]<sub>uCase</sub> (Merge head of)  
d. [<sub>N</sub> [<sub>N</sub> friend] [<sub>PP</sub> [<sub>P</sub> of] [<sub>DP</sub> [<sub>DP</sub> he] [<sub>D</sub> 's] [<sub>N</sub> friend]]]] (relabel)

- e. [<sub>DP</sub>[<sub>D</sub> the][<sub>NP</sub>[<sub>N</sub> friend][<sub>PP</sub>[<sub>P</sub> of][<sub>DP</sub>[<sub>DP</sub> he][<sub>D</sub>[<sub>D</sub> 's][<sub>N</sub> friend]]]]]<sub>uCase</sub> (Merge external D)  
 f. *the friend of he's => the friend of his* (Spellout: *he+'s = his*)
- (4) a. \*the friend his  
 b. [<sub>N</sub>[<sub>N</sub> friend][<sub>DP</sub>[<sub>DP</sub> he][<sub>D</sub>[<sub>D</sub> 's][<sub>N</sub> friend]]]<sub>uCase</sub>] (relabel)
- (5) a. a friend of John's  
 b. [<sub>DP</sub>[<sub>D</sub> a][<sub>NP</sub>[<sub>N</sub> friend][<sub>PP</sub>[<sub>P</sub> of][<sub>DP</sub>[<sub>DP</sub> John][<sub>D</sub>[<sub>D</sub> 's][<sub>N</sub> friend]]]]]
- (6) a. her friend/\*friend of her  
 b. \*hers friend/friend of hers

Although (5a) (=7a) and (7b) are both acceptable, they have different derivations, viz. (5b) and (7c), respectively, and these different structures can correspond to different interpretations. There is clearly a possession-type relation between *John* and *picture* in (7c) that is missing from (7d) (cf. Barker 1998).

- (7) a. a friend of John's (=5a)  
 b. a friend of John  
 c. [<sub>DP</sub>[<sub>D</sub> a][<sub>NP</sub>[<sub>N</sub> friend][<sub>PP</sub>[<sub>P</sub> of][<sub>DP</sub> John]]]  
 c. A picture of John's hangs in the gallery  
 d. A picture of John hangs in the gallery

Given that Merge is free, we also need to explain the ungrammaticality of spurious relabelings such as (8a) and (8b). (8a) can receive the same explanation as (4a); i.e. the derivation in (8c) crashes because Case remains unvalued for the inner *the*. However, we cannot appeal to Case to explain (8b); instead we simply note that *the* (and *a*) can never be stranded in English.

- (8) a. \*the friend the  
 b. \*the friend of the  
 c. [the [<sub>N</sub>[<sub>N</sub> friend][<sub>DP</sub>[<sub>D</sub> the][<sub>N</sub> friend]]]<sub>uCase</sub>]]  
 d. [the [<sub>N</sub>[<sub>N</sub> friend][<sub>PP</sub>[<sub>P</sub> of][<sub>DP</sub>[<sub>D</sub> the][<sub>N</sub> friend]]]<sub>uCase</sub>]]]

A reviewer points out, under the proposed account, that (9a) should be possible with the semantics given by the paraphrase in (9b). We will explain how (9b) can be formed through parallel Merge but not (9a).

- (9) a. \*Mary's friend of yours  
 b. the friend of Mary('s) and yours

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On the emergence of utterance-initial discourse-pragmatic marker: *ni-shite-mo* ‘even if, by the way’ in present-day Japanese

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Some recent work in historical pragmatics on the development of discourse-pragmatic markers in Japanese has been concerned with one of the regular developmental paths that utterance-initial discourse-pragmatic markers, such as *dakedo* ‘but’, *demo* ‘but’, *datte* ‘because’, and *dakara* ‘so’, are taking. Onodera (2014 and elsewhere) suggests that, in the history of Japanese, discourse-pragmatic markers tend to be recruited from linguistic items at the right periphery (RP) to those at the left periphery (LP). In the current study, I will report on the recent use of the utterance-initial or LP phrasal connective *ni-shite-mo* ‘even though, by the way’, which has thus far received little attention, and will show that it is undergoing a developmental process similar to the above-mentioned utterance-initial discourse-pragmatic markers. I will then discuss the development in light of constructionalization and constructional change (Traugott and Trousdale 2013; Traugott 2016).

In present-day Japanese, the phrase *ni-shite-mo*, i.e., a combination of “*ni* (dative particle) + *shite* (the conjunctive form of the verb *suru* ‘do’) + *mo* (focus particle)” is usually attached to a noun or a finite clause and functions as the clause-final connective, meaning ‘even though’ or ‘even if’, as in examples (1) and (2).

- (1) *Uten-ni-shite-mo*                      *kono kiroku-wa waru-sugiru.*  
rainy.day-*ni-shite-mo*                      this record-TOP bad-too  
‘Even though (it is/was a) rainy day, this record is too bad.’

- (2) *Makeru-ni-shite-mo*                      *saizen-o tsukuse.*  
lose-*ni-shite-mo*                      best-ACC do  
‘Even if (you may) lose (the game), do (your) best.’

(Daijirin)

However, the phrase is used utterance-initially, functioning as an utterance-initial or LP

discourse-pragmatic marker, as in example (3).

- (3) “*Ni-shite-mo*,                      *reizooko-made iru-no?*”  
      *Ni-shite-mo*                      refrigerator-to need-NML  
      ‘By the way, (do you really) need a refrigerator?’

(BCCWJ: OB6X\_00153)

It appears that the clause-initial use of the phrase *ni-shite-mo* as in example (3) is consistent with the tendency of discourse-pragmatic markers to be recruited from RP linguistic items, as in examples (1) and (2). The current study will investigate the use of the phrase *ni-shite-mo* as an utterance-initial discourse-pragmatic marker, analysing written conversations in historical texts (conversations in novels in the *Taiyo* Corpus (1895–1925)) and the Balanced Corpus of Contemporary Written Japanese (BCCWJ) (2001–2005), and present-day spoken conversations (*Meidai Kaiwa Corpus*). I will suggest that the path from RP linguistic item to LP discourse-pragmatic marker involves the ellipsis of anaphora (e.g. Matsumoto 1988), triggered by analogy based on structural and functional similarity to the existing forms.

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# The Left Periphery of DP and Information Focus: A Case Study of Double Genitives in English

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## 1. Introduction

Since Chomsky (1970), much generative research has been devoted to symmetry in phrase structure building and phrase-internal displacement across phrasal domains (e.g. Abney (1987)). Such research has indicated parallelisms between the clausal and nominal domains concerning grammatical functions (e.g. *subject* and *object*) and movement operations (e.g. *passivization*).

Recently, the important issue has been raised of whether the parallelism between the clausal and nominal domains extends to information packaging. The so-called cartographic approach hypothesizes that the CP domain splits into discourse-related projections such as topic and focus (Rizzi (1997)), and some researchers have attempted to extend the split CP hypothesis to the DP domain (e.g. Giusti (1996), Aboh (2004), and Corver and van Koppen (2009)). They claim that the DP domain includes a functional projection for contrastive focus (CFoc), which “represents a subset of the set of contextually or situationally given elements for which the predicate phrase can potentially hold” (É. Kiss (1998:245)).

With the above as our background, we explore the further possibility that the DP domain includes a functional projection to encode new information focus (IFoc). More specifically, this study suggests that the (preposed) possessum in English double genitives (cf. (3b)) has some phonological/interpretive properties of IFoc.

## 2. Information Focus in the CP Domain and the DP Domain

Rizzi (1997) originally hypothesizes that the CP domain includes only one CFoc projection, but Cruschina (2011) assumes an additional projection for IFoc in the CP domain, primarily on the basis of the non-contrastive focus fronting data in Sicilian and Sardinian, both of which are regional Romance languages in Italy:

- (1) A. Chi scrivisti? [Sicilian]  
 what write.PAST.1SG  
 ‘What did you write?’  
 B. a. Scrissi **n’articulu**. b. **N’articulu** scrissi!  
 write.PAST.1SG an article an article write.PAST.1SG  
 ‘I wrote an article.’ ‘I wrote an article.’

(Cruschina (2011:58), with slight modifications)

While the answer with the post-verbal IFoc in (1Ba) simply provides a neutral IFoc reading, the one with the fronted IFoc in (1Bb) is associated with emphasis, or the pragmatic effects “yielded by the relevant new information when it combines and interacts with the previous knowledge of the participants in the communication context ....” (Cruschina (2011:58)). The point here is that the CP domain has a functional projection dedicated to IFoc, which an inverted constituent may occupy (cf. 1Bb). Cruschina (2011) further attempts to extend IFoc fronting to the preposing of QPs (cf. affective operators, in Klima’s (1964) term), which is widespread in Romance:

- (2) **Tutto** ha mangiato a cena. [Italian]  
 everything have.PRES.3SG eat.PP at dinner  
 ‘He ate everything at dinner.’ (Benincà (1988:141-142))

If we follow the parallelism between the clausal and nominal domains, Cruschina's (2011) proposal will suggest that the DP domain includes IFoc, too.

This parallel view can be supported by Kayne's (1993) argument that English double genitives are derived by preposing the possessum (QP) within the DP domain. Unlike the definite possessive DP with the possessor-possessum order in (3a), the double genitive with the possessum-possessor order in (3b) behaves as an indefinite.

- (3) a. John's three sisters  
 b. three sisters of John's (Kayne (1993:5))

Abel (2006), furthermore, argues that the possessum of English double genitives shows focus effects. On the phonological side, the possessum, in general, receives a focal stress, and on the interpretive side, the double genitive functions to bring a referent into a prominent position in discourse; furthermore, the focus effect does not necessarily imply contrast.

### **3. Proposal**

The core of my proposal is that the possessum of double genitives moves into [Spec, IFoc] within the DP domain. Adapting Kayne's (1993) analysis, this study proposes the following derivation:

- (4) [DP [IFOCP [QP/NP three sisters] [IFOC' of [AGRP [DP John] [AGR' -'s <[QP/NP three sisters]>]]]]]  


First, the possessor is generated at [Spec, AGRP], and the possessum (QP) at the complement of the AGR head. Second, the possessum undergoes movement to [Spec, IFoc]. Third, I assume that *of*, inserted at the IFoc head, is a functional element which indicates the preposing of the possessum (cf. linker, in den Dikken's (1998, 2006) term). As a result, the entire DP behaves as an indefinite, which may introduce a new referent into the discourse.

The proposed analysis is supported by two pieces of evidence. First, as observed by Kayne (1993:4), a double genitive can occur in the post-copular position of the existential-*there* construction. Second, according to my informant, double genitives can be used as answers to *wh*-questions when the focal stress is on the possessum; the primary stress on the possessor is felicitous only when the possessor receives contrastive focus. We also argue that these two properties still hold for demonstrative double genitives and their emotional usage (cf. Narita (1986) and Barker (1998)).

### **4. Conclusion and Implications for Information Packaging within the DP Domain**

From a cross-linguistic perspective, the preposed possessum of English double genitives is peculiar in that it conveys new information focus; the preposing of the possessum in Romance languages, on the other hand, yields a contrastive focus interpretation of the possessor (e.g. Bernstein (2001)). Further research will be needed to find more empirical support for IFoc movement in the DP domain.

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## Contrastive Topics and the Dual Character of Imperatives

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**Introduction and the Puzzle** The dual character of imperatives (*command* and *permission*) has been a long lasting puzzle (Han 2000, Schwager 2006, Portner 2007, Kaufmann 2012, among others). This study explores the semantic/pragmatic relation between the character of imperatives and so-called *contrastive topics* (CTs). It is widely known that the Japanese morpheme ‘-wa’ is used to mark CTs (Kuno 1973, among others), as shown in (1).

- (1) dekakeru-mae-ni shukudai-**wa** yar-e.  
go.out-before-at homework-CT do-IMP ‘(At least,) do your HOMEWORK before going out.’  
↪ There are some alternatives that is unlike or to be contrasted with doing homework (e.g. clean the room, practice the piano, ...), and it is not necessary for the addressee to do them.

The *command imperative* in (1) obtains a command-reading in a context where the mother asks her son to do his homework before he goes out. By using CT-*wa*, (1) conveys that there is one or more alternatives that is “unlike” or to be “contrasted” with doing *shukudai* ‘homework.’ Furthermore, we can get a permission interpretation (as underlined in (1)) as a conventional implicature (CI). Interestingly, however, when CT-*wa* occurs in *permission imperatives*, no such CI is conveyed. The permission imperative with CT-*wa* in (2) expresses that there is one or more alternatives that is unlike or to be contrasted with drinking *mizu* ‘water’, however, we cannot get any permission interpretation as a CI.

- (2) mainichi hatarak-e!  
everyday work-IMP ‘Work everyday!’  
[...weeks past...]  
getsuyoobi-**wa** yasum-e!  
Monday-CT take.a.day.off-IMP ‘On Mondays, take the day off!’  
↪ There are some alternatives that is unlike or to be contrasted with Monday.

The central question in this research is how the CI in imperatives with CTs comes about: (i) why do command imperatives with CT-*wa* convey permission-reading as a CI?; (ii) how can we provide an account for the fact that permission imperatives with CT-*wa* do not convey a permission-reading as a CI? Since almost all studies of CTs in Japanese have focused exclusively on declaratives, these accounts have not been typically presented in a formal linguistic theory.

**Deriving the Permission-reading of Imperatives with CT-*wa*** Current theories of imperatives like Portner (2011) or Kaufmann (2012) argue that the effect of imperatives derives due to the same operator occurring in different contexts, so that the utterance of an imperative has different effects on the subsequent development of the common ground. Following their accounts, I assume that imperatives (including both *command* and *permission* imperatives) are related to necessity ‘□’, while typical permissions (e.g. “You can open the window.”) are related to possibility ‘◇’. When a command imperative with CT-*wa* is uttered, the alternatives are evaluated by an exhaustive operator given in (3) and all non-weaker alternatives are negated (Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012).  $\text{Exh}_{\text{ALT}}(p)$  in (3) states that  $p$  is true and that the only members of ALT that are true are those entailed by  $p$  (i.e. Nothing is true in ALT besides  $p$  and what follows from  $p$ ).

- (3)  $\llbracket \text{Exh}_{\text{ALT}}(p) \rrbracket^w = 1$  iff  $\llbracket p \rrbracket^w = 1$  and  $\forall \phi \in \text{ALT}(\phi(w)) = 1 \rightarrow (\llbracket p \rrbracket \subseteq \phi)$   
(Chierchia, Fox & Spector 2012)

I argue that CT-*wa* operates at the level of the imperative speech-act, in line with Tomioka (2010). Let us assume the following LF for imperatives with CT-*wa*.

- (4)  $[\text{Op} [\square_{\text{IMP}} [\text{Exh}_{\text{ALT}} [\text{TP} [\text{p}: [\dots [X\text{-}wa]_{\text{CT}} \dots ]]]]]]$   
(where **Op** is an alternative-generating operator (Tomioka 2010))

The necessity operator ‘ $\Box$ ’ in (4) briefly corresponds to the directive force operator developed in Kaufmann (2012), which are represented in the left-periphery of clauses with imperatives. Consequently, the relevant alternative to  $\Box p$  will be of the form  $\Box \phi$ , hence deriving  $\Box \neg \phi$  ( $= \Box \neg \phi$ ) as a CI. For example, the possible alternatives of the utterance in (1) can be represented as in (5).

- (5) The set of alternatives generated in (1):  
 $\{\Box[\text{clean}(\text{addr}, \text{room})], \Box[\text{practice}(\text{addr}, \text{piano})], \Box[\text{clean}(\text{addr}, \text{kitchen})], \dots\}$   
 (i.e.: It is necessary for addr to {clean the room, practice the piano, clean the kitchen, ...}.)

When (1) is uttered by the speaker, these alternatives are negated and a CI is derived as shown in (6).

- (6) CI of the utterance in (1):  
 $\{\neg \Box[\text{clean}(\text{addr}, \text{room})], \neg \Box[\text{practice}(\text{addr}, \text{piano})], \neg \Box[\text{clean}(\text{addr}, \text{kitchen})], \dots\}$   
 $= \{\Diamond[\neg \text{clean}(\text{addr}, \text{room})], \Diamond[\neg \text{practice}(\text{addr}, \text{piano})], \Diamond[\neg \text{clean}(\text{addr}, \text{kitchen})], \dots\}$   
 (i.e.: It is possible for addr not to {clean the room, practice the piano, clean the kitchen, ...}.)

**Explaining the Puzzle (ii)** Following the assumption that *command* and *permission* imperatives are both related to the same operator, it is expected that we can get a permission-reading from permission imperatives with CT-*wa* as well as command imperatives. As I have noted, however, the example provided in (2) shows that permission imperatives with CT-*wa* do not convey a permission interpretation. This can simply be explained by focusing on the function of imperatives. Portner (2011) suggests that permission imperatives arise when the imperative adds a property which is inconsistent with the *To-do List* (TDL). I argue that the CI of a permission-reading is blocked by the properties of the addressee’s TDL. For instance, the addressee’s TDL before and after the second utterance in (2) is illustrated in (7). ((7a) indicates the addressee’s TDL after the first utterance in (2).)

- (7) Addressee’s To-do List (TDL) before/after the second utterance in (2):  
 a.  $\text{TDL}_{\text{addr}} = \{\text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Sun}), \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Mon}), \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Tue}), \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Wed}),$   
 $\quad \downarrow \quad \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Thu}), \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Fri}), \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Sat})\}$   
 b.  $\text{TDL}_{\text{addr}} = \{\text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Sun}), \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Mon}), \neg \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Mon}), \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Tue}),$   
 $\quad \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Wed}), \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Thu}), \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Fri}), \text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Sat})\}$

The illustration in (7) shows that the second utterance in (2) adds the property ( $=$  ‘*take the day off on Monday*’) which is inconsistent with the TDL in (7a). Due to this, the previous property, namely to *work on Monday*, is no longer required, which leads to the situation where ‘*taking the day off on Monday*’ is permitted. The crucial point here is that when permission imperatives are uttered, the alternative requirements are already in the addressee’s TDL. In the current example, the expected CI is ‘it is possible for the addressee not to work on {Sunday, Tuesday, ...}’, as provided in (8).

- (8) (The expected) CI of the second utterance in (2):  
 $\{\neg \Box[\text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Sun})], \neg \Box[\text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Tue})], \neg \Box[\text{work}(\text{addr}, \text{Wed})], \dots\}$

Since the contents in (8) are inconsistent with the addressee’s TDL in (7a), these are blocked by those of (7a) and are thus not conveyed.

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## Resolving Prefixation into Compounding and Inflection

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### 1. Morphological Status of Prefixes and Word Formation

Prefixes have been discussed in terms of their morphological status: Are they (bound) lexical morphemes, that is, lexemes, or functional morphemes, that is, phonological realizations of grammatical features? This question arises partly because prefixes show different properties from suffixes. For instance, prefixes entirely lack category-changing functions (Nagano (2011)). The question is directly related to the delineation of prefixation. When a prefix is a lexeme, the process of attaching it does not belong to derivation but to compounding. Thus, if many prefixes have the lexeme status, prefixation plays a lesser role in derivational morphology than is generally assumed.

In this respect, Nagano (2013a, 2013b: 121) argues that many English prefixes (e.g., *anti-*, *circum-*, *multi-*, *super-*) are lexical, but negative prefixes (e.g., *de-*, *non-*, *un-*) and aspectual prefixes (e.g. *be-*, *en-*, *re-*) are functional. The lexeme status can be confirmed, for example, by coordination reduction (CR). Uncontroversial compounds allow CR (e.g., *book-\_\_ and newspaper-stands / book-binders and \_\_-sellers* (Kenesei (2007: 274)). Likewise, the prefixes in (1) can undergo CR. However, negative and aspectual prefixes do not allow CR, as in (2).

(1) super-\_\_ and supra-national / anti-federalist and \_\_-nationalist (opinions) (Kenesei (2007: 274))

(2) \*Mary un- and re- tied her laces. (Sadler and Arnold (1994: 208))

Given these examples, Nagano (2013a) eliminates “lexical prefixes” like those in (1) from derivational morphology; it is compounding that they participate in.

Nagano’s study contributes to a more precise delineation of prefixation. However, there is another set of controversial morphemes she does not explicitly address: morphemes that are formally identical to prepositions, such as *out-*, *over-*, and *up-* (see e.g. Kastovsky (2013), Olsen (2014: section 3.3.2)). CR reveals that many of them behave in the same way as lexemes. For example, *up-* and *over-* allow CR:

(3) a. Geographically, the research focuses on two geographical areas, up-and low-country.

(Dulna Karunarathna (2014) *Imaging the Role of Women in Changing Social-Cultural Contexts*, p. i)

b. I now know how much I overate and drank in my previous life!

(<http://www.sterlingclinics.co.uk/ian-lost-6st-in-23-weeks/>)

However, not all of the relevant morphemes behave in the same way; *out-* used in a comparative sense (i.e. ‘surpass’ or ‘better’) resists CR:

(4) \*Mary out-ran and -swam Bill. (Sadler and Arnold (1994: 208))

This indicates that *out-* is a functional morpheme. In that case, what grammatical features does it realize and how is the realization implemented? We aim to answer these questions within Emonds’ (2000, 2005) theoretical assumption.

### 2. Theoretical Assumption

Emonds (2000) assumes that grammatical features (e.g., those of gender, number, and comparison) can be alternatively realized by a functional morpheme in a different syntactic position from theirs. In this case, the morpheme is inserted at PF, that is, after Spell-Out. For example, the feature [PAST] in I (or T) can be phonologically realized by *-ed* under V (Emonds (2000: 127)). He calls this type of realization “Alternative

Realization (AR)” and considers that AR corresponds to inflectional morphology. Emonds (2005: 259) briefly argues that the aspectual prefix *re-* is also an example of an AR: It alternatively realizes a feature complex, including [AGAIN] in a post-verbal complement. In addition, Emonds (2005: 280) analyzes *mis-* ‘badly’ (e.g., *misbehave*), a close relative of negative prefixes (Plag (2003: 99)), as an AR of [MANNER, EVALUATIVE, NEGATIVE] in a post-verbal phrasal position.

### 3. Proposal

Given the dichotomy of prefixes, only functional prefixes can be subject to AR. In fact, negative prefixes can be analyzed as ARs of [NEGATIVE], and aspectual prefixes as ARs of some grammatical features related to aspects like [AGAIN], as assumed in Emonds (2005). Since *out-* in (4) is functional, it can also be analyzed as an AR of certain grammatical features in some post-verbal phrasal position. More precisely, we propose that the comparative *out-* is an AR of a feature set, including [MANNER, COMPARATIVE, EVALUATIVE, POSITIVE], being inserted at PF.

If *out-* is inserted after Spell-Out, then we can predict that the verbs with comparative *out-* do not undergo pre-Spell-Out processes, such as zero-nominalization (or V-to-N conversion) (cf. Naya (2016: 60)). This prediction is correct: The noun *outrun*, for example, lacks the ‘surpass’ sense (e.g., ‘an act of running better or faster than someone’) but rather has the spatial meaning of ‘[t]he act or fact of running out’ (*OED*).

### 4. Consequence

Our study has an important consequence to the division of labor in morphology. Given that AR corresponds to inflectional morphology, the insertion of functional prefixes is also inflectional. Combined with Nagano’s (2013a) analysis of certain prefixes as lexemes, this indicates that prefixation can be resolved into compounding and inflection. That is, prefixation has no role in derivational morphology. This further leads us to conclude that the process derivation bears an exclusively category-changing function.

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## The *Because* X Construction: Not Constructionalized Yet?

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This talk deals with a new usage of *because* that has recently emerged (henceforth, the *because* X construction), exemplified in (1a), from the perspective of constructionalization (cxzn) (Traugott and Trousdale (T&T) (2013)). Sentence (1a) conveys in essence the same meaning as a sentence like (1b) (henceforth, the causal *because*-clause construction):

- (1) a. I cannot go out with you today *because homework*.
- b. I cannot go out with you today *because I have a lot of homework*.

Kanetani (2015) posits an instance link and inverse subpart link between these constructions (cf. Goldberg (1995)). In order for the Goldbergian inheritance links to be posited, the constructions need to be established as grammatical constructions. Therefore, the specific research question I set out is whether the *because* X construction is constructionalized or not.

T&T (2013:22) define cxzn as “the creation of form<sub>new</sub>-meaning<sub>new</sub> (combinations of signs”. One could see the form of an expression like *because homework* as a product of the omission of a full clause, just like reduced clauses introduced by other adverbial subordinators, exemplified in (2):

- (2) *When in difficulty*, consult the manual. (Quirk et al. (1985:1079))

In (2), the implied subject and verb that follows are definite; hence, they are recoverable. If the word *homework* in (1a) were a reduced clause, the omitted words should also be recoverable. Unlike (2), however, they are not “uniquely recoverable” in the sense of Quirk et al. (1972:536); nor will it be almost impossible to determine whether the word that follows *because* is the subject, object, or another element of a corresponding clausal counterpart. As Schnoebelen (2014) reports, interjections, as well as nouns and adjectives, frequently appear in the X-slot, as in (3):

- (3) Admittedly, not in the UK yet *because aargh!* (Twitter)

Even with situational information, it will be particularly difficult for one to uniquely recover a clause from an utterance like this. Therefore, arguing against the view of the *because* X construction as a reduced clause, I claim that the construction has undergone a syntactic change. Turning to the meaning pole of the construction, I argue that the construction is pragmatically distinct from the causal *because*-clause construction. That is, based on Kanetani’s (2016) claim that the word in the X-slot functions as expressing the speaker’s thought, I consider the *because* X construction a speaker-oriented construction, in that the speaker does not observe the first part of the Gricean Maxim of Quantity; that the hearer must make more effort to understand the meaning of the utterance.

In short, the *because* X construction is characterized as follows. Formally, the word in the X-slot is not a reduced clause but is a product of a syntactic change. Semantically, it is comparable to the causal *because*-clause construction. Pragmatically, the speakers do not make their contribution as informative as is required, leaving the interpretation to the hearers.

Cappelle (to appear) proposes a view of a construction as a tripartite, not bipolar, structural unit, claiming that pragmatic information should be stored separately from semantic information in a construction, if the construction has “pragmatic information [that] is conventionalized and therefore has to be learned and stored”. Such a treatment of constructions requires us to read the meaning pole in T&T’s (2013) definition of *cxzn* (i.e. *meaning<sub>new</sub>*) as either (i) *semantic<sub>new</sub>*, (ii) *pragmatic<sub>new</sub>*, or (iii) *semantic<sub>new</sub>-pragmatic<sub>new</sub>*, of which the *because X* construction exemplifies the second case for the reasons mentioned above. A question arises as to whether such a partial change in the meaning pole paired with a *form<sub>new</sub>* could be treated as a case of *cxzn*. The answer to this question is inextricably linked to the answer to the research question of this talk. I argue that the *because X* construction is not constructionalized yet, but is on the way to *cxzn* (or, at the stage of pre-*cxzn* constructional change (cf. an anonymous reviewer’s comment)) along the process that T&T (2013:91f.) propose. I also point out that this conclusion, nevertheless, is not incompatible with the inheritance links that Kanetani (2015) posits. According to T&T, it is “only when morphosyntactic and semantic neoanalyses ... have been shared in population of speakers and a new conventional symbolic unit ... has been created” (p.92) that *cxzn* occurs. At a stage prior to this, in which the hearer’s interpretation and analysis of a construct does not match the speaker’s analysis, a tenuous link is created by the hearer “between a construct and a different part of the constructional network than intended” (ibid.:91). Thus, I claim that it is “tenuous” links of this kind that Kanetani (2015) posits between the causal *because*-clause construction and the *because X* construction.

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## Ryoichiro Kobayashi (Sophia University/JSPS)


**Null variable is *pro*:** In Japanese, gaps without linguistic antecedents are licensed (1), which is impossible in English. Abe (2009) claims that a base-generated null variable ( $=[e]$ ) is bound by, and gain its reference from *Op*, which is identified with the prominent referent in the discourse. The gap cannot be elided argument, since it lacks an overt antecedent (Hankamer and Sag 1976).

- Although little is said about such discourse-related *Op* in  $\phi$ -rich languages, such gaps are also

(2) [e] viene. (Context: *Students heard footsteps from outside just before the class.*)  
come.3sg ‘(The teacher) comes.’ (Maia Duguine p.c.)

**Obviated AC:** Following Chomsky's (2015) *strong/weak* distinctions of T, I propose that the Activation Condition (Chomsky 2000) is obviated as in (3) when the probe is *strong*.

- (3) Activation Condition (revised): The goal must have [uF] in order to Agree with weak heads. In English, [u $\phi$ ] on T fails to Agree with its goal since *pro* universally lacks [uCase] (see below). Weak T in English is constrained by (3), thus [u $\phi$ ] is left unvalued, which crashes at the interfaces, as in (4). The same applies to V in both English and Spanish-type languages since it is weak (5) (Chomsky 2015). Thus *pro* is not licensed in object positions in both types of languages.
- (4) Weak T: ...C... [<sub>TP</sub> T<sub>[u $\phi$ , NOM]</sub> [<sub>vP</sub> *pro*<sub>[v $\phi$ ]] ...]]... (e.g. English-type languages)  
|                  ↑ \* $\phi$ -agree since there is no [uCase] on *pro*</sub>
- (5) Weak V: ...v\*... [<sub>VP</sub> V<sub>[u $\phi$ , ACC]</sub> *pro*<sub>[v $\phi$ ]] ...] (e.g. Spanish-type/English-type languages)  
|                  ↑ \* $\phi$ -agree since there is no [uCase] on *pro*</sub>

(6) Strong T: ...C... [TP T<sub>[uφ, NOM]</sub> [<sub>v</sub>\*P *pro*<sub>[vφ]</sub> ...]]... (e.g. Spanish-type languages):  


***pro* is Caseless:** I propose that *pro* universally lacks [uCase]. It is true that *pro* appears in the Case position, [Spec, TP], where other nominals receive their Case value. However, this is not problematic to my argument for the following two reasons: First, the Case-filter *per se* states that it is defined on the NP with phonetic content, thus *pro* or PRO is not constrained straightforwardly (Chomsky 1981:49). Second, in the current minimalist program, Case is also considered as a feature that is to be licensed. As long as there is [uCase] on a nominal in Narrow Syntax, it must be valued and deleted before Transfer. Therefore, it naturally follows that if there is no [uCase], then there is no need for the valuation to occur.

(7) a. Acreditam [<sub>FIN</sub> que [pro] têm gastado esse dinheiro para nada]  
 think.3pl that [pro] have.3pl spend.past this money for nothing  
 ‘They think [that they have spent this money for nothing].’  
 b. Acreditam [<sub>INF</sub> [e] terem gastado esse dinheiro para nada]  
 think.3pl [e] to.have.3pl spend.past this money for nothing  
 ‘They think [[e] to have spent this money for nothing].’

(8) a. Afirmar [pro terem lhe roubado este livro]  
affirm.3sg (they) to.have.**3pl** you stolen be book  
Lit. 'He affirms [they to have stolen this book from him].'  
b. Ele diz [pro semos pobres]  
he say.3SG (we) to.be.**1pl** poor  
Lit. 'He says [we to be poor].'

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## Second Language Acquisition of Demonstrative Distance Relations

*Simone Lechner, University of Hamburg*

This paper investigates transfer effects in the acquisition of deictic contrast relations in demonstratives in spoken language, focusing on the acquisition of demonstratives in L1 English, Japanese and German speakers learning L2 German, English and Japanese. In spoken language, German demonstrative pronouns are arguably distance-neutral (Ahrenholz 2007: 39, cf. Himmelmann 1997), although they are distance-oriented (Diessel 1999: 38-39), i.e. the occurrence of demonstrative pronouns is limited to *diese/r/s* (which is sometimes replaced by stressed determiner *der/die/das*). English has a two-way system in terms of distance (proximal (*this/that*) and distal (*these/those*)) (cf. Huddleston and Pullum 2002) and is also distance-oriented. Finally, Japanese has a tripartite, person-oriented system that differentiates between proximal to the speaker (*kono/kore*), proximal to the addressee and distal to the speaker (*sono/sore*), and distal to both the addressee and the hearer (*ano/are*) (Diessel 1999: 39). German and English demonstrative pronouns have the same form in adnominal and pronominal position, whereas Japanese demonstrative pronouns differ in inflection depending on whether they occur in adnominal (*kono/sono/ano*) or pronominal (*kore/sore/are*) position (cf. Diessel 2013). Based on Diessel's (1999:2) broad definition of demonstratives, locative adverbs are also taken into account. German and English both have a bilateral system distinguishing between proximal (Eng. *here*, Ger. *hier*) and distal (Eng. *there*, Ger. *da/dort*), whereas Japanese again has a tripartite system. Japanese locative adverbs (*koko/soko/asoko*) have the same lexical stem as Japanese demonstrative pronouns.

This study focuses on L1 English, L1 Japanese and L1 German speakers aged 20-25 in advanced stages of acquiring L2 German, L2 English and L2 Japanese. One of the main purposes of this study is to critically re-examine claims made in Lado's (1957) Contrastive Hypothesis, which suggests that elements in the L2 that are different from the L1 will be more difficult to acquire, while elements that are similar to the L1 will be easier to acquire. Although Lado's hypothesis is fairly old and has been extensively criticised in the past, more recent studies have identified typological proximity as an important predictor for potential language transfer (Jarvis and Pavlenko 2010, Ringbom 2007). The claims made in the Contrastive Hypothesis are compared to the possibility that it is the complexity of the linguistic feature in question that most accurately predicts potential transfer effects, i.e. that for example a more complex system with more spatial dimensions in the speaker's L1 makes it easier to acquire a less complex system with less spatial dimensions in the L2. The proposed bilateral approach to transfer effects is especially promising when attempting to disambiguate genuine transfer effects from developmental stages of language acquisition.

The investigated sample consists of n=180 informants aged 20-25 with comparable socioeconomic and educational backgrounds in similar stages of language acquisition (n=30 L1 German and n=30 L1 Japanese speakers with L2 English, n=30 L1 Japanese and n=30 L1 English with L2 German, n=30 L1 German and n=30 L1 English speakers with L2 Japanese). Data consists of three elicitation tasks focusing on distance relations when using demonstratives, as well as a grammatical judgment task.

Tables 1 through 3 show preliminary results for the first experiment for the 15 informants from each sample group evaluated so far. Preliminary results indicate significant differences ( $\chi^2=6.039$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ) in the use of distal and proximal demonstrative pronouns by L1 Japanese and L1 German learners of English as an L2. Interference effects seem more likely for German learners of English, whereas the Japanese deictic demonstrative system facilitates the

(target-like) acquisition of the English system. In this instance, typological proximity does not seem to be the strongest predictor for transfer, suggesting that the complexity of the feature in the L1 plays a more pronounced role. Moreover, L1 German learners of English use a greater range of expressions to convey differences in relative distance.

		proximal dem. (this)	distal dem. (that)	det. (the)	dem./ det. + locative adverb	locative adverb only
Japanese	L1	15	0	0	0	0
(n=15)						
German	L1	10	2	0	3	0
(n=15)						

Table 1: Experiment 1 for L2 English (Situation 1, proximal to speaker and hearer)

		proximal dem. (this)	distal dem. (that)	det. (the)	dem./ det. + locative adverb	locative adverb only
Japanese	L1	12	3	0	0	0
(n=15)						
German	L1	4	3	3	4	1
(n=15)						

Table 2: Experiment 1 for L2 English (Situation 2, distal to speaker, proximal to hearer)

		proximal dem. (this)	distal dem. (that)	det. (the)	dem./ det. + locative adverb	locative adverb only
Japanese	L1	0	15	0	0	0
(n=15)						
German	L1	3	2	2	6	2
(n=15)						

Table 3: Experiment 1 for L2 English (Situation 3, distal to speaker and hearer)

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## The Passivization of the Gesture Expression Construction and the Formulation of Subjects in terms of Aboutness

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**Abstract:** The central goal of this talk is to capture the apparently contradictory behavior of the Gesture Expression Construction (henceforth, GEC) with respect to its passivization (cf. Kogusuri (2011)). More specifically, adopting Rizzi's (2006) formulation of subjects in terms of aboutness, I argue that (i) the expression nominal in the postverbal position originally fails to be passivized due to its inherent non-referential property, but (ii) the nominal can be considered eligible for passivization once its referentiality is enhanced by contextual information (cf. Mikami (2013)). This analysis not only proves that the apparent contradictory behavior follows from the general property of subjects; it also holds promise for clarifying the interface between syntactic/semantic structures and discourse.

**Core Puzzle:** In this talk, I investigate the GEC, as exemplified by (1) and schematized in (2):

- (1) a. She smiled her thanks.
- b. She nodded approval. (Kogusuri (2011: 149))
- (2) a. Syntactic Structure: [S NP<sub>i</sub> [VP V ([bound pronoun]<sub>i</sub>'s) NP<sub>j</sub> ]]
- b. Meaning: 'X<sub>i</sub> express (X<sub>i</sub>'s) [emotion/attitude]<sub>j</sub> by V-ing.'

This construction usually takes an unergative verb as its main predicate (cf. Levin (1993)), and the verb expresses the gesture that the referent of the subject makes; and the postverbal position is occupied by a non-subcategorized NP, often termed the expression nominal, which describes the expression conveyed by the gesture. According to Massam (1990), the expression nominal contains a bound pronoun, irrespective of whether the pronoun is expressed overtly or covertly. No element containing a bound pronoun is allowed to be passivized, as the ungrammaticality of (3) shows (cf. Zubizarreta (1985)). Thus, it has widely been accepted that the expression nominal fails to be passivized due to the presence of a bound pronoun, as shown in (4):

- (3) \*His<sub>i</sub> role was played by John<sub>i</sub>. (cf. John<sub>i</sub> played his<sub>i</sub> role.) (Zubizarreta (1985: 256))
- (4) a. \* A cheerful welcome was beamed by Sandra. (Levin (1993: 98))
- b. \* Grateful thanks were smiled by Rilla. (Massam (1990: 108))

Contrary to the general consensus, however, Kogusuri (2011) points out that the nominal can be successfully passivized when no element encoding the agent participant is realized as a possessor pronoun and a *by*-phrase:

- (5) a. On the day of departure, Glyndwr's men assembled, a few mounted, and wagons were ready to roll. *Final goodbye were waved.* (Kogusuri (2011: 149))
- b. ... as the time [of fitting out] neared when the last line is cast off, *the goodbye are waved*, the screw makes the water boil under the stern, and the passage to Alaska is under way. (Kogusuri (2011: 163))

A reasonable question arises from the above discussion: What makes it possible for the nominal expression to be passivized in acceptable cases like (5)? This talk attempts to account for such a contradictory behavior of the GEC in terms of the general property of subjects.


**Theoretical Assumptions:** Rizzi (2006) proposes a new formulation of subjects, using two notions of aboutness and D-linking:

- (6) a. Subject: +aboutness, -D-linking
- b. Topic: +aboutness, +D-linking (Rizzi (2006: 122))

According to this formulation, subjects are required to bear an aboutness feature, as is the case with

topical elements. In this talk, focusing on the referential aspect of aboutness (cf. Sornicola (2006)), I define subjects as referential elements (cf. Mikami (2013)). Furthermore, following Osawa (2009), I assume that contextual information can contribute to enhancing the acceptability of a sentence. It follows that even though intrasentential information renders a construction unacceptable, contextual information can override the constraint violation and license the construction pragmatically.

**Proposal&Analysis:** Assuming the formulation of subjects in terms of referentiality and the function of context for promoting acceptability, I analyze the passivized GEC as a pragmatically licensed construction. More specifically, I argue that (i) the expression nominal originally fails to be passivized due to its inherent non-referential property, but (ii) the nominal can serve as a subject in the passivization process once its referentiality is supplemented by contextual factors. This analysis succeeds in viewing the contradictory passivizability of the GEC observed between (4) and (5) as merely an apparent phenomenon and giving a principled explanation for the apparent contradiction in terms of the general property of subjects. Under Rizzi's formulation of subjects, it is only referential elements that have potential for serving as subjects (cf. Mikami (2013)). Given that the expression nominal contains a bound pronoun, which is required to be bound by its antecedent (cf. Massam (1990)), it follows that the expression nominal is inherently non-referential. That is, the referent of the nominal is not identified until the establishment of a binding relation between the nominal and its antecedent. Unfortunately, however, when the GEC is passivized without any appropriate context, the expression nominal cannot gain referentiality, because the nominal in the subject position is prohibited from being bound by its antecedent in the *by*-phrase, as schematized in (7b):

- (7) a. \* A cheerful welcome was beamed by Sandra. (= (3a))  
 b. [s (one's<sub>i</sub>) a cheerful welcome [[<sub>VP</sub> was beamed ] by Sandra<sub>i</sub> ]]
- 

In this configuration, the expression nominal is judged inappropriate for a subject due to its non-referential property. In contrast, once enough information to identify the referent of the expression nominal is introduced in discourse, the nominal can be considered eligible for passivization, as observed in (5), repeated here as (8):

- (8) ... as the time [of fitting out] neared when the last line is cast off, *the goodbye are waved*, the screw makes the water boil under the stern, and the passage to Alaska is under way. (= (5b))

This sentence describes a typical scene when a ship sets sail for Alaska, and one could easily judge the referent of the expression nominal from context, even though no information about the relevant agent is explicitly mentioned. The establishment of this kind of cross-sentential binding, combined with the deletion of the inappropriate syntactic chain for binding, constitutes a pragmatic “repair strategy” to override the syntactic violation, whereby the expression nominal enhances its referentiality; hence, the nominal is pragmatically judged appropriate for a subject.

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## Pragmatic Constraint on *There Speak* Construction and Its Peculiarities

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This study discusses deictic *there* construction with the verb *speak*:

(1) A: I can't decide which clothes to buy. Should I just get everything?

B: There speaks a rich person.

As observed by Lakoff (1987) and Breivik (1990), the deictic *there* construction is known to allow verbs of existence or motion. However, the construction permits the unergative verb *speak*, which expresses a volitional action on the subject's part.

The main purpose of this study is to propose the following pragmatic constraint on this *there speak* construction, which cannot be predicted from the central deictic *there* construction.

### (2) Pragmatic Constraint on *There Speak* Construction

*There speak construction is only grammatical when there is a preceding utterance that a subject should say.*

This constraint can adequately account for the grammaticality of (3):

(3) He gave her a sideways look. 'Cold,' he said succinctly. 'Damp.' Her mouth twitched. 'You're no romantic,' she chided. 'I haven't the time for romance,' he said shortly. 'There speaks a workaholic,' she observed with faint disapproval. [BNC]

In (3), the *there speak* construction serves as a comment to an utterance made by the hearer, which denotes a statement that workaholics should say, *I haven't the time for romance*. This utterance is required for the construction, as shown by (4):

(4) A: Do you know where Yuhei is? I want to talk with him about his brother.

B: I saw him two minutes ago. Oh, he is over there. \*There speaks a workaholic.

This *there speak* construction is ungrammatical because it lacks a preceding utterance that a workaholic should say. Therefore, even if a person associated with a subject is really speaking, we cannot use this construction without help of preceding remarks that the subject should say.

The function as a reply to a preceding remark is closely related to three characteristics. First, subjects should be specific in that they are sufficiently evoked within the context. This is because without specification the speakers cannot describe the unique characters well.

(5) A: I have nothing to do all afternoon.

B: a. \*There speaks a man.

b. There speaks a lazy person.

c. There speaks a man without a care in the world.

A *man* in (5a) is very abstract and cannot be rationally linked with the preceding utterance, while the nouns in (5b) and (5c) are specific enough to associate these with the foregoing remarks. In other words, the subjects should be specific nouns expressing an evaluation to the hearers well.

Second, the *there speak* construction often has negative connotations in the conversation. In (6), the man is worried about money, but he is made fun of because the speaker thinks that he is very stingy.

- (6) “And I’ve decided to get myself a car.” “What!” He puts down his glass so suddenly the drink spills over. “You said you were going to buy yourself a computer.” “That too.” “Jill, you’re crazy. Squandering your money this way. It’s going to vanish in no time.” “There speaks the accountant’s son!” “No, I’m serious.” (Moving On)

As is clear from this passage, the *there speak* construction conveys an ironical implication to the hearer. If someone does not say anything special, the speaker does not have to use the *there speak* construction. Also, it is not natural to praise someone by referring to his remarks. Rather, we tend to be cynical about some strange comments which interlocutors make. This usage is similar to that of epithets such as *bastard* and *jerk*.

Finally, based on these points, it can be said that the function of this construction is to characterize and evaluate the hearers. Normal deictic *there* constructions describe the existence or motion of an entity. However, this *there speak* construction enables speakers to introduce a unique entity associated with the interlocutor into the conversation and label him/her as the subjects indicate

To sum up, the *there speak* construction is very different from the central deictic *there* construction in the aforementioned four respects. It can be used only when there is a preceding remark that the subject should mention; by using this construction, the speakers characterize the hearer with an implication of the speaker’s negative attitude toward the hearer.

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## How do relational adjectives change into qualitative adjectives?

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Like many other European languages, English has the relational-qualitative distinction in N-to-A derivation. RELATIONAL ADJECTIVES (RA) are attributive-only, nominal adjectives whose function is classification, while QUALITATIVE ADJECTIVES (QA) are canonical adjectives whose function is property predication (Beard 1977; 1991; 1995, Levi 1978, McNally & Boleda 2004, Fábregas 2007; 2014, Fradin 2007; 2008, Bisetto 2010, Rainer 2013, Shimamura 2014, Nagano 2016, among others). Just as complex event nominals, simplex event nominals, and result nominals, the three nominalization classes in V-to-N derivation, can be distinguished from one another by a set of criteria (Grimshaw 1990, among others), the two adjectivalization classes can be distinguished by the following set of criteria:

	RA	QA
a.	Always denominal	Not necessarily derivative
b.	Attributive only	Predication possible
c.	Strictly adjacent to the modified noun	Adjacency to the noun is not required
d.	Argument-saturating capacity	No argument-saturating capacity
e.	Incompatible with an indefinite degree modifier	Gradable by an indefinite degree modifier
f.	Comparative forms are difficult.	Comparative forms possible
g.	Coordinated with a bare-nominal modifier	Coordinated with a non-derived basic adjective
h.	Nominalization is difficult.	Nominalization possible
i.	Prefixal negation by <i>non-</i> . <i>Un-</i> is difficult.	Prefixal negation by <i>un-</i> is possible.
j.	Quantifying and spatiotemporal prefixes (e.g. <i>mono-</i> , <i>pre-</i> ) possible	Quantifying and spatiotemporal prefixation is difficult.
k.	Adverbial form by <i>-ly</i> (if any) functions as a frame adverb sentence-initially.	Corresponding <i>-ly</i> adverbs do not function as frame adverbs.

In this paper, I will offer a new empirical generalization about form-meaning correspondence found in English denominal QAs and seek an explanation for it that is adequate not only theory-internally but also in light of general human psychology. The generalization in question is given in (1) below, along with concrete examples of its key concepts in (2).

(1) Qualitative adjectives of the RESEMBLE class do not have a relational counterpart, while those of the REPRESENT class have one.

(2) a. RESEMBLE QA

*John is **childish** for a full professor.* (Fábregas 2014: 284)

= “John **is similar to a child** from the standard of a full professor.”

b. REPRESENT QA

*Peter’s utterance is **ungrammatical**. [...] Peter surely isn’t trying to be **ungrammatical**, and yet...* (Clark 2004: 378)

= “Peter’s utterance does not **represent grammar**.”

c. RA counterpart of REPRESENT QA

*three **grammatical** components*

= “three components **of grammar**”

According to Beard (1977, 1995) and Levi (1978), QAs are different from RAs in that while the latter are derived solely from nouns through the process of transposition, the former are derived by the incorporation of a noun with another, predicating constituent. The generalization in (1) means that QAs that are derived based on the predicative element RESEMBLE or BE SIMILAR TO do not have a relational usage. They are non-ambiguous. For example, *childish* is used solely in the sense “be similar to a child.” In contrast, QAs whose semantics should be paraphrased as “REPRESENT THE BASE N” rather than “RESEMBLE/BE SIMILAR TO THE BASE N” have a relational usage. That is, one and the same derivative can be both relational and qualitative if the QA usage is of the REPRESENT type. Thus, *grammatical* is ambiguous between the senses “be representative of grammar” and “of grammar.”

Discussing the event-result distinction in deverbal nominalizations, Alexiadou & Grimshaw (2008) and Naya (2016) distinguish two analyses of V-to-N derivation: one-step analysis (V > event N; V > result N) and two-step analysis (V > event N > result N). In this paper, I will argue that English N-to-A derivation makes use of both one-step and two-step derivational paths. QAs of the RESEMBLE type are formed in the one-step manner (N > QA), while those of the REPRESENT type are formed in the two-step manner (N > RA > QA). Specifically, I will argue that one cohort of N-to-A affixes, which includes *-ish* used in (2a), are semantically rich, being inherently endowed with an LCS of *resemble* or *be similar to*. Such an affix incorporates the base into the LCS variable position, directly turning it into a QA. On the other hand, there is another cohort of N-to-A affixes which are semantically sparse. The suffix *-al* in (2b, c) is one of them. They do not contribute any semantic content, but rather they are formal markers of the process of transposition (Beard 1995). Using transposition to manipulate the base noun’s referential index, it is possible to transpose a noun first into an RA and further transpose the output into a QA. In this case, the resultant QAs always have a relational counterpart. Also, the predicative element REPRESENT is not introduced by the relevant affix (such as *-al*) but rather accrues from the RA > QA transposition. Why do RAs produce QAs of the REPRESENT type? On this point, I will refer to a type of everyday inference called PSYCHOLOGICAL ESSENTIALISM (Lakoff 1987). Roughly, human beings have a strong tendency to infer an entity’s attributes from its classification. If someone belongs to the class called “mother,” she **is supposed to** have attributes generally or culturally attached to this class and behave accordingly. If RAs are forms of class membership, as is widely assumed, QAs transposed from them can be seen as forms of class representativeness. [References omitted. Please refer to the upcoming conference hand-out.]

**1. Introduction.** In reference to Recanati (1993), this presentation discusses three types of contexts where referential terms can be used “oblique-referentially” to show that the referential opacity involved in oblique-referential terms is understood in terms of reference that takes place outside of the current speaker’s dialogue domain. This study builds on Miki’s (1996:640) following statement: “What descriptions (i.e. referential terms) count as opaque ... depends crucially on what is assumed to be shared as mutual knowledge. Likewise, what descriptions are regarded as transparent depends crucially on whether the descriptions are made from the perspective of the ongoing interchange.”

**2. Recanati’s paired notions of “oblique-attributive” and “oblique-referential.”** We first review at least four different readings which Recanati (1993:390) says examples like (1) can have:

(1) John believes that the winner will go to Hong Kong.

Recanati argues that besides the attributive and referential readings given by the speaker of this sentence, *the winner* in the complement allows oblique-attributive and oblique-referential readings given by the person referred to by the matrix subject: in the former, the matrix subject doesn’t know who the winner is, and believes that whoever it is, he or she will go to Hong Kong. In the latter, the matrix subject, but not the speaker, knows who the winner is, and uses *the winner* to refer to that person; oblique-referential terms are those whose referents are transparent to the matrix subject, but are opaque to the speaker. They carry reference for which the speaker relies on someone else.

The oblique-referential reading is also available from attributive vocatives which are used on the basis of what Clark and Carlson (1982) call “addressing by attribution,” as exemplified in (2):

(2) Schwartz, to history students: Any of you who needs a syllabus, raise your hand.

In (2), the speaker doesn’t know who are the addressees of his imperative at the time of his utterance, so *any of you who needs a syllabus* is opaque to him. As a matter of self-awareness, however, it is transparent to each of those history students who needs a syllabus. As Clark and Carlson note, speakers who use attributive vocatives do not call the addressees directly, but instead, describe the attributes that the addressees in their minds are expected to have. This process called “addressing by attribution” is responsible for introducing other oblique-referential terms, too.

**3. Non-anaphoric third-person pronouns in media dialogue.** The oblique-referential use is also found with non-anaphoric third-person pronouns typically used in media dialogue where the author purports to talk with readers by addressing each of them in the second-person singular, as in (3-5):

(3)

A gift for him?

Sometimes, a smitten groom will surprise his bride with a small token of love either the night before or the morning of the wedding. Similarly, it is not unknown for the bride to do the same for her groom. As simple as a card telling him how much you’re looking forward to seeing him at the altar, to a bottle of his

(4)

**YOU GOT  
THE BIG  
JOB.  
CAN HE  
DEAL?**

(5)

You were lucky in love this summer, Pisces! Now, you have to keep your relationship strong. Plan activities for the two of you to bond over and don’t forget to introduce him to your BFFs so he feels important.

In (3), *his* in the first sentence is anaphoric to *a smitten groom*, but *him* in the third sentence is not; it stands for the reader's groom. This is due to the fact that it is part of the author's mock dialogue to the reader, which makes a separate domain from the preceding text. The same is true of *him* in the elliptical title of (3) and *he* in the interrogative title in (4). Non-anaphoric third-person pronouns standing for the reader's intimate partner typically occur in media dialogue whose topics include personal relations such as love, marriage and gifts, i.e., topics with which the author can talk with each reader about his or her intimate partner. The non-anaphoric nature of the pronouns in question is evidenced by (5), where the referent of *him* in *don't forget to introduce him to your BFFs* is found deictically rather than anaphorically as the person each reader is paired with in *the two of you*.

The *you* in media dialogue has much less to share with the speaker, or author, than the attributive vocative in (2), and provides a stronger example of addressing by attribution. Since (3-5) come from women's magazines, the interested reader can take the *you* as transparently referring to herself, who is described as "whoever you are, you are expected to have a set of attributes as a typical reader of this magazine, e.g., a woman interested in marriage or career" (cf. Talbot (1992)).

In using the third-person pronouns paired with the attributive *you*, the author can only purport to refer to the person who he believes is the one to whom the reader refers. They may be equivalent to *your man*, *your sweetheart* or *your husband*, but no exact paraphrase is available for the author because it is up to the reader, and more importantly, they are substitutes for *you* in the reader's next direct discourse. Since *you* is an only pronoun for addressing in English, the terms that can replace *you* outside of the ongoing interchange have to be pronouns in another person, too (cf. Kuno (1972)). In (4), "You got the big job. Can he deal?" is the author's precursor to the next utterance of the reader of this article, i.e., "I got the big job. Can you deal?" The pronouns in question are opaque to the author, but are oblique-referential to each reader of the relevant media dialogue.

**4. Theoretical implications and concluding remarks.** The pronouns with the reader's partner reading differ from definite descriptions in the *believe*-complement as to the structure in which they are used, but share a common contextual setting, which is captured by the following principle:

- (6) The oblique-referential reading is assigned to referential terms whose reference is exercised by other people than the one who uses them in the ongoing interchange.

This implies that referential opacity belongs to evidentiality, for it comes from the speaker who uses another person as the information source of referential terms and lets that person rather than himself engage in reference assignment of those terms (cf. Aikhenvald (2006)). Addressing by attribution is a dialogue-based method to express evidentiality by address terms and other terms paired with them, allowing the speaker to use the terms without knowing the validity of the reference he makes.

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# Possessional Adjectives as Transposed NPs

Kazuya Nishimaki (University of Tsukuba)

**1. Possessional Adjectives: Phrase-Based Derivatives** Derived adjectives involving the suffix *-ed*, e.g. *blue-eyed*, are morphologically problematic. The problem is that these adjectives, which we call Possessional adjectives following Beard's (1995) terminology, are based on phrases in violation of No Phrase Constraint, which states that derivatives have no phrasal base. Their phrase-basedness is seen from their semantics. For example, *blue-eyed* means "having a blue eye/blue eyes (Plag (2003: 153))," which implies that it is analyzed as [<sub>A0</sub> [<sub>NP</sub> *blue-eye*]*ed*]. Their phrase-basedness can also be found in their phrasal stress patterns. Shimamura (2007: 376) points out that their main stress is on right-hand nouns:

- (1) [short-témper]ed, [low-héel]ed, [long-lég]ged

The aim of the present paper is to solve this problem by analyzing Possessional adjectives as transpositional derivatives in the sense of Marchand (1966, 1969). We claim that they are adjectivizations of NPs, which retain their properties after category-shifting.

**2. Transpositional and Semantic Derivation** Marchand (1966, 1969) distinguishes between two types of derivation: transpositional and semantic. The crucial distinction is that transpositional derivation is a process of pure category-shifting, which leaves bases intact except for their categorial labels, whereas semantic derivation involves semantic addition to bases. Transpositional and semantic derivation are illustrated by *novel writer* (*X is a novel writer*) and *writer* (*X is a writer*), respectively. According to Marchand (1966: 138), *novel writer* is merely the nominalization of the underlying sentence *someone writes a novel*; on the other hand, *writer* contains the additional elements of content 'habitual' and 'literature' because it denotes the habitual agent performing literary writing.

**3. Transpositional Analysis** Relying on the notion of transposition, we propose that Possessional adjectives derive from the transposition from NPs into A<sup>0</sup>s. Thus, we assume that *blue-eyed* has the NP *blue eye* transposed into an A<sup>0</sup>. Due to the transposed status, Possessional adjectives inherit properties from their underlying NPs. Therefore, they exhibit phrasal properties even if their categorial label is A<sup>0</sup>.

Note that the present analysis is independently motivated; we can nicely explain other phenomena than phrasal semantics and stress patterns by analyzing Possessional adjectives as transpositional derivatives. Such phenomena include the parallelism between Possessional adjectives and another type of transpositional derivative, i.e. a gerundive synthetic compound like *city-destroying*. Marchand (1969: 18-19) points out that it transposes a VP, e.g. *to destroy a city*, into an N<sup>0</sup>. The parallelism immediately follows, given that Possessional adjectives and gerundive synthetic compounds constitute a natural class as transpositional derivatives. For instance, both types are parallel in retaining the same idiomatic reading as their underlying categories. Observe that the following *whistle-blowing* has the same reading as its underlying VP idiom *to blow the whistle* meaning 'to betray':

- (2) It took internal whistle-blowing and investigative journalism to uncover the rot.

(Collins COBUILD Advanced Dictionary of English<sup>7</sup>, s.v. *whistle-blowing*)

Idiomatic Possessional adjectives are exemplified by *hard-headed*, which shares the idiomatic reading with the

underlying NP *hard head* to mean ‘stubborn’ (see Beard (1995: 345)). These retained idiomatic readings are natural consequences of transposition, which has no semantic effect.

Another parallelism is that both types depend on their underlying categories in licensing their co-occurring items. The following contrast shows that infinitival clauses can occur with gerundive synthetic compounds but not with non-deverbal nouns like *trip*:

- (3) a. city-destroying to prove a point (Roeper (1987: 294))  
 b. \* the trip in order to prove a point (Ito and Sugioka (2002: 77))

It is widely held that the infinitival clauses illustrated in (3) are licensed by verbal argument structures. Plausibly, in (3a), the argument structure comes from the underlying VP. On the other hand, the following examples indicate that Possessional adjectives pattern with their underlying NPs regarding the license of degree adverbs like *very*:

- (4) a. The knives are mostly rectangular, with very sharp edges [...]. (Alone with the Hairy Ainu)  
 b. This tool has a (\* very) single edge.  
 (5) a. Silk-screen printed images are not always very sharp-edged [...]. (Charts & Graphs)  
 b. This is a (\* very) single-edged tool.

In (4a), the NP *sharp edges* licenses *very* because it contains the gradable *sharp*, which *very* modifies. In contrast, in (4b), *very* is not licensed because it has nothing to modify in the NP *single edge*; *single* is non-gradable. The contrast along the same line is observable in the Possessional adjectives given in (5).

Under the present analysis, all these phenomena are given a unified account as reflecting properties of underlying categories, to which transposition applies. Notice here that they are reminiscent of inflection; its distinctive feature is entire inheritance from bases without semantic effect. This points to the possibility that transpositional derivation is inflectional rather than derivational (see Nagano (2015)). Also, the present analysis means that transpositional suffixes like *-ed* and *-ing* are pure category-changers; their only and main function is to change one category into another, which is required by syntactic contexts.

This paper has shown that Possessional adjectives can be best analyzed as transpositional derivatives. Their phrasal properties reflect their transposed status. An independent motivation for our transpositional analysis comes from the parallelism between Possessional adjectives and gerundive synthetic compounds, which demonstrates that both share categorial status as transpositional derivatives. Their behaviors strongly suggest that transpositional derivation is more inflectional than derivational.

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# Specific Features of INTELLIGENCE Metaphors in Terms of EATING Concepts in Japanese and English

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## 1. Introduction

This paper discusses metaphors in Japanese and English which represent mental activities concerning human intelligence, such as ‘thinking’, ‘considering’ or ‘understanding’, in terms of concepts of eating behavior, such as ‘chewing’, ‘swallowing’ or ‘digesting’. On this issue, Matsui (2010) examines a variety of ‘UNDERSTANDING metaphors’ in the two languages, and claims that conceptual metaphors in Japanese and English have many traits in common. To be sure, we can find many common ideas in Japanese and English metaphors. However, the commonalities and differences between expressions of metaphors in the two languages remain as matters to be discussed further. This paper shows the actual conditions of the Japanese and English metaphors in question, and reveals the distinguishing features of the two languages’ EATING-INTELLIGENCE metaphor systems.

## 2. Discussion

Kövecses (2010) gives ‘THINKING IS COOKING’, ‘ACCEPTING IS SWALLOWING’, ‘CONSIDERING IS CHEWING’, ‘UNDERSTANDING IS DIGESTING’ and ‘MENTAL WELL-BEING IS PHYSICAL NOURISHMENT’ as conceptual metaphors that provide the submappings of the IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor (Kövecses 2010: 83-84). To clear up the problem, I rearrange the metaphors in the list and classify the submappings of the IDEAS ARE FOOD metaphor into three distinctive types:

**TYPE A:** which represent THINKING in terms of COOKING

**TYPE B:** which represent ACCEPTING in terms of EATING

**TYPE C:** which represent INTELLECTUAL PROCESS in terms of EATING PROCESS

I focus on TYPE C above and describe the correspondence between the concepts of eating process and intellectual process in English as shown in Figure 1 (examples are shown in the presentation).




Figure 1. EATING-INTELLIGENCE metaphors in English

In this way, concepts of chewing, digestion and absorption are mapped on to concepts of intellectual processes in English.

Following the same process, I then map the correspondence between concepts of the eating process and the intellectual process in Japanese EATING-INTELLIGENCE metaphors (cf. Nabeshima 2004). These concepts may be arranged as in Figure 2 (Examples will be shown in the presentation).




Figure 2. EATING-INTELLIGENCE metaphors in Japanese

As presented here, the Japanese metaphors in question map concepts of chewing (*sosyaku*), swallowing (*enge*), digestion (*syouka*) and absorption (*kyuusyuu*) on to intellectual processes. In addition, we can find metaphors in Japanese which represent the result of each aspect of the eating behavior shown above: '*sosyaku suru*' → '*kamikudakeru*' (be crunched), '*nomikomu*' → '*hara-ni otiru*' (falling into stomach), '*syouka suru*' → '*konareru*' (be digested), '*kyuusyuu suru*' → '*mi-ni tuku*' (nourished). In this way, concepts derived from eating processes are closely linked to intellectual processes in Japanese.

### 3. Conclusion

From the discussion here, we can conclude that although metaphors in Japanese and English are often based on the same ways of thinking, they also have distinctive characteristics in regards to how they embody certain concepts. Phases and degrees of intellectuality are more precisely described in terms of eating processes in Japanese than in English. Further studies will cultivate a better understanding of the metaphorical embodiment of the concepts of human intelligence in Japanese and English.

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# The Early Acquisition of Clefts in Child Japanese

## Akari Ohba (Ochanomizu University)

**1. Introduction:** This study reports our experimental results and shows that children acquiring Japanese were able to comprehend cleft sentences correctly with felicitous previous contexts with pictures, contrary to the results of previous studies (Bever 1979, Lempert and Kinsbourne 1980, Dansako and Mizumoto 2007 a.o.).

**2. Previous Studies:** It has been reported that children acquiring English have problems with object clefts. In object clefts (OCs), an object is focused (ex. It is a rabbit that the bear chased.) In subject clefts (SCs), a subject is focused. Dansako and Mizumoto (2007) have reported that Japanese children also have problems with OCs. Japanese clefts allow two types, Case-marked and non-Case-marked clefts, and the presence or absence of movement in each type has been discussed by Hoji 1987, Cho et al. 2008, Hiraiwa and Ishihara 2012 among others. Recently, Aravind, Freedman, Hackl and Wexler (2016) reported that English-speaking children become successful with SCs and OCs when felicitous previous contexts were given with pictures. We examined Japanese children's comprehension of non-Case-marked clefts following Dansako and Mizumoto (2007). In our first experiment, we adopted Aravind et al.'s (2016) methods to examine children's performance of true clefts with matched and mismatched contexts. In our second experiment, we examined whether children could reject false cleft sentences with previous contexts and pictures.

**3. Experiments:** We tested 37 children (4;2-6;4) in total using the Truth Value Judgement Task (TVJT). In Experiment 1, we tested 11 children (4;3-6;4). Following Aravind et al. (2016), a child was given two pictures in sequence in each story, as shown in (1) and (2).

**(1) Subject Cleft (SC) with matched contexts**

Matched context: Look! Someone is chasing the pig.

Test sentence: Butasan-o oikake-teiru no wa lionsan da.  
                   Pig-Acc chasing C Top lion Cop  
                   'It's a lion that is chasing the pig.'



**(2) Object Cleft (OC) with mismatched contexts**

Mismatched contexts: Look! Someone is poking the panda.

Test sentence: Kumakun-ga tutui-teiru no wa pandasan da.  
                   Bear-Nom poking C Top panda Cop  
                   'It's a panda that the bear is poking.'



In the first picture, one of the two animals was hidden with a gray box, and a child heard a matched or mismatched context for the test sentence which was then given in the second picture. In the second picture, the child could see who was hidden in the gray box. The child was then asked to judge whether the true SC or true OC was true or false. Since the children performed well with true clefts in Experiment 1, we expected they would be able to correctly reject false clefts. We conducted Experiment 2 with 26 children (4;2-6;4) using the TVJT. As in Experiment 1, we used two pictures in each story. 3 false SCs and 3 false OCs were tested presenting a context with the first picture and a false test sentence with the second picture, as shown in (3) and (4).

**(3) Subject Cleft (False)**

Context: Look! Someone is chasing the pig.

Test sentence: Lionsan-o oikake-teiru no wa butasan da.  
                   Lion-Acc chasing C Top Pig Cop  
                   'It's a pig that is chasing the lion.'



**(4) Object Cleft (False)**

Context: Look! A bear is poking someone.

Test sentence: Pandasan-ga tutui-teiru no wa kumasan da.  
                   Panda-Nom poking C Top bear Cop  
                   'It's a bear that the panda is poking.'



**4. Results and Discussion:** In Experiment 1, the children performed quite well with true SCs and true OCs with the matched contexts: 90.9% for SCs and 97.7% for OCs as in Table 1.

**Table 1: The percentages of children's correct responses in Experiment 1**

(M=Matched, Mis=Mismatched, SCs=subject clefts, OCs=object clefts)

	M, SCs	Mis, SCs	M, OCs	Mis, OCs
4-year-olds (N=4)	75% (3/4)	75% (6/8)	93.8% (15/16)	91.7% (11/12)
5-year-olds (N=5)	100% (5/5)	90% (9/10)	100% (20/20)	100% (15/15)
6-year-olds (N=2)	100% (2/2)	50.0% (2/4)	100% (8/8)	66.7% (4/6)
Total (N=11)	<b>90.9% (10/11)</b>	<b>77.3% (17/22)</b>	<b>97.7% (43/44)</b>	<b>90.9% (30/33)</b>

The results of Experiment 2 are shown in Table 2 below.

**Table 2: The percentages of children's correct responses in Experiment 2**

	False, SCs	False, OCs
4-year-olds (N=13)	71.8% (28/39)	89.7% (35/39)
5-year-olds (N=11)	100% (33/33)	97.0% (32/33)
6-year-olds (N=2)	100% (6/6)	100% (6/6)
Total (N=26)	<b>85.9% (67/78)</b>	<b>93.6% (73/78)</b>

Considering the overall results, the children remarkably rejected false SCs and false OCs quite well (SCs: 85.9% (67/78), OCs: 93.6% (73/78)), which are much higher percentages than the previous studies in English and Japanese (Bever 1979, Lempert and Kinsbourne 1980, Dansako and Mizumoto 2007). Statistical analyses (using t-tests) do not reveal significant differences between SCs and OCs ( $p=0.26$  for 4-year-olds,  $p=0.34$  for 5-year-olds). Although there is no statistically significant difference of the cleft-types, the correct responses for false SCs of 4-year-olds (71.8%) is a little lower than that of the OCs (89.7%). The percentage for SCs with mismatched contexts in Experiment 1 (77.3%) was also not high compared to OCs with mismatched contexts (90.9%). These results may be due to the word order of SCs in Japanese, which is similar to scrambled sentences in that the first NP contains an accusative case. As Otsu (1994) reported, Japanese children tend to misinterpret the scrambled object NP as an agent when the scrambled sentence is given without a felicitous previous context. Given that the contexts of false clefts and clefts with mismatched contexts in Experiment 1 and 2 are mismatched, the relatively low performance for SCs can be explained by Otsu's analysis. Thus, the 4-year-olds' lower percentages of SCs may not be due to the lack of the knowledge of clefts but due to the problem of sentence-initial object NP with the accusative case marker in Japanese. Regarding false OCs, even 4-year-olds correctly rejected false OCs 89.7% (35/39) of the time. This result is much higher than Dansako and Mizumoto (2007)'s Japanese 4-year-olds' results of OCs, i.e. 41.7% (15/36).

To conclude, the children of all ages performed quite well with not only SCs but also OCs contrary to previous studies. Therefore, our experiments have shown that Japanese children comprehended clefts well when they were given matched contexts with pictures and we conclude that children have knowledge of clefts early in Japanese.

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# **Meta-Pragmatic Roles of the First-Person Pronoun in Japanese: A Comparative Study of Japanese and English Language Use in Interaction**

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One of the biggest differences between Japanese and English discourse is the use of the first-person pronoun. Although English generally requires the first-person pronoun when referring to the speaker, Japanese does not, due to structural restrictions and pragmatic usage in discourse. The fact that Japanese does not always require the first-person pronoun suggests that the use itself involves certain meanings. Based on this consideration, this study compares the first-person pronoun in the subject position in Japanese and English, and tries to reveal the meta-pragmatic roles that the Japanese first-person pronoun itself involves. The term "meta-pragmatic" in this study refers to emphasis on elements of communication indicating the communicative framework, as shown in Koyama (2016).

Previous studies which compare the properties of the subject in languages including Japanese and English have shown that Japanese does not need the subject itself, while English does. As one of the causes of the occurrence and non-occurrence of subject, Ikegami (1980) discusses the different degree of agentivity between Japanese and English: while Japanese tends to suppress the human individual, English tends to focus on it and represent it prominently. In addition, Ide (2006) and Fujii (2016) claim that in Japanese, the speaker is buried in the context or *ba* (field) as one of the elements, assuming each element involving the interlocutor in the *ba* is shared knowledge. Because the speaker and the interlocutor share the internal perspective, the speaker's reference is understood and does not have to be indicated.

The data used in this study is "Conversation" in Japanese and American English in the Mister O Corpus<sup>1</sup>, in which two native speakers talk about a surprising experience for 5 to 8 minutes. This study shows that the total number of first-person pronouns used in English is more than 7 times greater than in Japanese. In English, the speaker always refers to the first-person pronoun from an objective perspective, owning the meta-pragmatic role of indexing the speaker as a narrator or referring to the speaker as a character in the story she is narrating. In Japanese, on the other hand, the speaker has an internal perspective shared with the interlocutor, and does not usually use the first-person pronoun as it is understandable. However, the first-person pronoun is sometimes used, owning different meta-pragmatic roles from English.

This study introduces the following types of meta-pragmatic roles observed in Japanese data: presentation of an episode, distinction of the subject, and contrast between the subject and the interlocutor and/or the character(s) in the story. The example

below includes the first-person pronoun “*watashi*,” which involves these three roles.

(1) *Nanka-ne, konaida Waseda-to-sa atashi nomikai it-te ki-ta jyan*

“Well, I recently went to a *nomikai* (a gathering) with students at Waseda University, right?”

The utterance in excerpt (1) occurs at the beginning of the speaker’s episode, and it is considered that the speaker uses the first-person pronoun “*watashi*” to begin her episode. In addition, when seeing the whole discourse, it is shown that she uses it to distinguish herself from others as the subject, as well as to contrast herself with the interlocutor, who didn’t go to the gathering. This suggests that the first-person pronoun in excerpt (1) indexes the context as well as shows the speaker’s intention.

Comparing Japanese and English interactions, this study considers in particular how the Japanese first-person pronoun behaves in discourse owning meta-pragmatic roles.

## Note

1. The “Mister O Corpus” is a cross-linguistic video corpus collected for the projects entitled “Empirical and Theoretical Studies on Culture, Interaction, and Language in Asia” under a Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (No. 15320054 directed by Sachiko Ide). The corpus consists of three types of interaction—conversations, narratives, and problem-solving tasks—in Japanese and American English.

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### ***Soramimi* - reinterpretation of English song lyrics by Japanese speakers**

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Misheard lyrics or *mondegreens* occur when a listener perceives different words from those actually produced by the singer (e.g., Wright, 1954; Kentner, 2015). This auditory illusion often happens when the lyrics are not in the native language of the listener. *Soramimi* are well known in Japan for the popular TV-show *Soramimi Hour*, in which viewers submit their own collections of misheard lyrics, which are then illustrated with humorous videos. In the current investigation, we argue that this reinterpretation of English song lyrics by native speakers of Japanese is a result of their perception of the English lyrics through Japanese phonology.

The phonotactic structure of Japanese has strict constraints on legal sound combinations. Japanese only allows open syllables, i.e. CV or V, and does not permit consonant clusters, or consonant codas except for /n/ (Tsujimura, 2014; Kubozono, 2015). Any word of foreign origin that enters the Japanese language must adhere to the phonotactics of Japanese and is, by extension, processed through the filter of Japanese phonotactics. An example is the English word *baseball* ['beɪs, bɔːl], which is adapted into Japanese as *be-subo-ru* [be:subo:ru], the extra vowels being inserted in order to avoid consonant clusters that are acceptable in English but not in Japanese. The rhythm of Japanese is mora-timed (e.g., Kubozono, 2015). The mora is a unit of syllable weight, whereby CV is a light syllable – one mora – and CVV or CVC (in some languages) is heavy, consisting of two moras. In Japanese, CVN (where N denotes a nasal sound) counts as a heavy syllable (e.g. Kubozono 2015; Tsujimura 2014).

This difference in phonotactics and rhythm not only affects the syllable structure of the word, but it also affects how native speakers perceive both native and foreign words. Japanese speakers have been shown to parse strings of sounds in terms of moras rather than syllables (Otake et al., 1993; Kubozono 2015). Furthermore, /n/ is perceived by Japanese speakers (in its non-syllabic form) as a separate mora unit (Loveday, 1996; Scherling, 2015). Kubozono (1999) gives examples of speech errors by Japanese speakers which demonstrate the existence of syllable-internal mora boundaries for these speakers. Nonce words are also affected by the speaker's native language phonotactics; an experiment by Dupoux et al. (1999) found that Japanese speakers tended to perceive epenthetic vowels that were not present in nonce words, because they were perceiving it through Japanese phonotactics.

Based on the above research, we hypothesised that the Japanese renderings of English lyrics are fundamentally based on adapting the English to Japanese phonotactics. In order to test this, we examined 20 examples of *soramimi*. Both the original English lyrics and their Japanese counterparts were transcribed into IPA. Based on an approach in Otake (2007), all examples were categorised as deletions, insertions or substitutions of sounds. This allowed us to determine how the English lyric structure compared with the Japanese *soramimi* structure. An example is from the song *Follow Me* by Savatage:

Lyric	I knocked on every door	Anata nee, buri dou (Darling, how about a yellowtail?)
IPA	[anaktanevɪdoː]	/anataneeburidou/
Changes	4 substitutions; 1 deletion; [ɑ] of <i>on</i> reanalysed as word-final [a], [n] of <i>on</i> reanalysed as onset, [ɛ] of <i>every</i> reanalysed as word-final [e], [v] reanalysed as onset [b].	

Initial results show that the *soramimi* tend to (1) substitute English sounds with the closest Japanese alternatives, for example, reduced vowels (e.g., [ə]) in English become full vowels such as [e] or [a] in Japanese, while English [u] or [w] become Japanese [u], (2) insert vowels to break up consonant clusters or to avoid consonant codas, and (3) parse coda consonants that follow a long vowel in English as syllable onsets in Japanese.

The result in (1) supports the theory of perceptual assimilation, “a process that applies during speech perception and that maps non-native sound structures onto the phonetically closest native ones” (Peperkamp et al., 2008: p.131). The results in (2) and (3) highlight the importance of syllable structure and mora weight in the reinterpretation of English lyrics. Results indicate a preference for reanalysis of word boundaries over insertion, meaning that a consonant at the end of a word in the English version tends to get used as the beginning of a following word in Japanese. We argue this is due to the fact that inserting more vowels would both change the sound sequences too much and also affect the rhythm of the lyrics. Further examples are currently being analysed and will be subjected to statistical analysis.

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How the recipient recognizes the Quasi-Internal Monologue in Dialogues:  
Cross-Linguistic Study in Japanese and English

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In daily life, one might likely hear a family member talking to himself/herself when others are present: "Wonder if the rain has stopped." In this kind of situation, the speaker's full or partial internal monologue reveals one's inner feeling, and her internal monologue is not particularly directed to a recipient; the line which lies between discourse and internal monologue is defined as "*quasi-internal monologue* (Noda 2006)." When the recipient hears the speaker's quasi-internal monologue, she has a choice whether s/he responds to a previous utterance or simply pretends that nothing has been heard. Since the internal monologue is a voice of someone's mind which is spoken out loud enough for those people who listen by any chance, it is worth to study how the recipient responds to the speaker's quasi-internal monologue, if one has a choice to reply. Therefore this study attempts to show how the recipient recognizes the quasi-internal monologue out of discourse in Japanese and American English.

In order to show the clear differences between discourse and internal monologue, all utterances that are suspected to be internal monologues are run through the scientific computer software, called PRAAT. PRAAT is an acoustic intonation analyzer that investigates aspects of speech sounds, like the amplitude of waveforms. For those waveforms that are flat in structure are considered to be internal monologues. Therefore, after running utterances through PRAAT, only internal monologues are identified, exclusively extracted, and analyzed for this study. In addition to the above, quasi-internal monologues are examined, for the purpose of double checking the criteria of an internal monologue, based on the following explicit features: utterance of the quasi-internal monologue falls, volume becomes soften or murmured, and speed becomes slow (Moriyama, 2001; Mimaki, 2013). The data for this study uses video corpus data in Japanese and American English. They are collected for the purpose of investigating cross-linguistic comparative studies in Japan. All video data are recorded and transcribed in respective languages. The subjects for this video corpus are all female teachers and students. Each pair, either teacher-student or student-student, is asked to arrange 15 picture cards and make a coherent story, task-solving, but told that there are no "correct" stories and no time constraints.

The results suggest that quasi-internal monologues are uttered based on two forms: question to others and internal arguments within the self for both languages. The data below is a sample excerpt includes an internal argument in Japanese:

→1 S2: *a, de, kore-de ii?*

"Aa, and, is this good?"

- 2 S1: *de, kore-ga, koc-chi-de* “And, this goes here.”  
 →3 S2: *de, ii-no-ka-na* ↓ **“And (I wonder if) this is good ↓”**  
 4 S1: *kon-na kanji?* “Like this?”  
 5 S2: *un* “Yes.”

In line 1, S2 asks the recipient, *kore-de ii?* (“Is this good?”), as a means of saying, *Are we done?* However, in line 3, the speaker expresses her internal argument within the self for not having confidence about the card arrangements by using the quasi-internal monologue of *de, ii-no-ka-na* ↓ (“And (I wonder if) this is good ↓”). For internal argument forms, both Japanese and American English speakers utter quasi-internal monologues as if they were questioning to themselves, but there is a major difference between the two languages with regard to the recipients’ reply. Japanese recipients either respond or do not respond to quasi-internal monologues, whereas American English recipients reply to quasi-internal monologues as if they were hearing the utterance. In the latter category, internal argument means that the speaker uttering a quasi-internal monologue is trying to negotiate within herself. For speakers in both languages, quasi-internal monologue as internal argument receives the recipient response but for Japanese speakers, the recipients reply either in a monologic way or with the token acknowledgement of *un* or, in English, “yeah.” For American English, the quasi-internal monologue, again, receives a substantial response from the recipient.

Since full and partial quasi-internal monologues sound monologic for both languages, the utterances are equivocal and not specifically directed to the listener; when the speaker’s utterance sounds monologic, it is plausible that the listener does not feel the speaker’s utterance is imposing and interrogative. In Japanese interaction, the quasi-internal monologues reveal the speaker’s inner thoughts without any imposing and interrogating of the other. On the other hand, in American English interactions, the quasi-internal monologues work as a form of utterance and response.


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# English Perfect Aspect and Mandarin Double *Le* Construction: A Focus Approach

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This paper studies the mechanism that underlies two seemingly different structures: the perfect aspect in English and the Double *Le* Construction (DLC) in Mandarin. I will argue that the *have*+*past participle* form is a complex expression consisting of focus (Schwarzschild 1999) and perfectiveness (Smith 1997). In this system of perfect, the auxiliary *have* is a focus marker, which stresses the termination of an event or state, as represented by the perfective inflection of the predicate, while in Mandarin these functions are carried by the two versions of *le*. Syntactically, this focus phrase (FocP) selects a perfective aspect (AspP) and gives a perfect reading. The auxiliary *have* then undergoes head movement to T for feature checking. The basic diagram for a perfect aspect sentence is shown in (1).



I will provide three arguments in favour of this proposal. First, as is observed in Michaelis (1994), perfect aspect is not acceptable in cleft structures, as shown in (2). I argue this is because the cleft structure is also a focus structure, and the existence of multi-foci makes the computation of semantics harder.

(2) ?? It is/was John who has/had broken the cup. (cf. It was John who broke the cup.)

Further, perfect in English is not compatible with certain adverbs, especially manner and locative ones, as in (3) and (4). Following Cinque (1999), I assume manner and locative adverbs adjoin to phrases above VP when focused. These phrases can be quantificational in nature when they scope over the perfective aspect phrase and thus separate it from the FocP. (3) and (4) then becomes ungrammatical since *has* exclusively selects a perfective AspP.

(3) John [FocP has [QP [AspP closed the window] (? quickly)]]]. (cf. John closed the window quickly.) (For sake of simplicity the raising of *has* to T is not shown here.)

(4) John [FocP has [QP [AspP peeled three potatoes] (? in the garden)]]]. (cf. John peeled three potatoes in the garden.)

On the other hand, resultative adverbs and locative arguments are allowed because they scope rather low inside the VP and do not intervene between FocP and AspP, as in (4) and (5).

(4) John [FocP has [AspP [VP closed the window tightly]]].

(5) John [FocP has [AspP [VP put three potatoes in the bucket]]].

At last, there are restrictions on the interpretation with perfect sentences compared with those in simple past. For example in (6), the wide scope reading of the indefinite is banned.

(6) Everyone (#has) watched a film, namely *Titanic*. (Not in experiential reading).

I suggest this is a case that demonstrates Beck's Effect (B&K 1997) or Linear Crossing Constraints (Tanaka 1997), which claims that some focus phrases can become barriers to covert but not overt scrambling. Examples are also found in Korean and Japanese, which are typical wh-in-situ languages.

(7) a. \*Minsu-man nuku-lul po-ass-ni?      b. Nuku-luli Minsu-man ti po-ass-ni?  
Minsu-FOC who-ACC see-Past-Q.      Who-ACC Minsu-FOC see-Past-Q

(8) a. \*Dare-mo nani-o kawa-nakatta-no?      b. Nani-o dare-mo ti kawa-nakatta-no?  
anybody what-ACC buy-NEG.PAST-Q.      what-ACC anybody buy-NEG.PAST-Q

The wide scope reading of *film* in (6) depends on the quantifier raising of the object, which, based on my account should not be available in this occasion as the focus projection headed by the auxiliary is an intervener.

As a comparison, I propose that the structure with both word-final and sentence-final *le* in Mandarin Chinese, namely the Double *Le* Construction, is functionally equivalent to the perfect aspect in English, as in (9).

(9) Zhangsan chi le san-ge pingguo le.

Zhangsan eat LE three-CL apple LE.

Zhangsan has eaten three apples.

Syntactically, I will show that DLC, compared with the word-final *le* cases, has a more restricted distribution, just like those of English perfect shown above: it is banned in cleft constructions, as in (10); it does not co-occur with manner and location adverbs, as in (11); it does not allow a wide scope interpretation of an existentially quantified internal argument, as in (12), although judgements may be affected by dialectal variations.

(10) Shi Zhangsan da-sui le Lisi de beizi (??le).

COP Zhangsan hit-break LE Lisi DE cup. LE.

(11) Zhangsan zai huayuan li (feikuai-de) xiao le san-ge tudou (?le).

Zhangsan in garden in (quick-DE) peel LE three-CL potato LE.

(12) Mei-ge xuesheng dou kan le yi-bu dianying (\*le), ji Titanic.

Every-CL student all watch LE one-CL film LE namely Titanic.

Following Wang (2016), I assume sentence-final *le* is a focus marker, although it differs from *have* in that it is a head-final particle *t*. This is a cross-linguistic argument that perfect is formed by perfective aspect and focus.

A few predictions are borne out from this focus-based analysis. For example, it provides an account for a puzzle of perfect aspect in Mandarin. Unlike in English, where *have+not+V-ed* is a principled form for the negation of perfect, Mandarin does not allow the co-occurrence of negative perfective marker *mei-you* and sentence-final *le*, as in (13). This restriction is unexpected if sentence-final *le* is not related to perfectivity (Soh&Gao 2006). I argue that this difference between Mandarin and English is the result of the different status of negation in the two languages. Following Ernst (1995), I assume *not* in English is the specifier of an independent projection NegP, while *mei* in Mandarin is just a prefix realizing [+NEG] on *you*. In the English perfect *not* is merged higher than *have*. It appears linearly after the auxiliary in the final order because *have* raises to T to check tense feature, which means *not* will not intervene between FocP and AspP, as shown in (14). But in Mandarin if sentence-final *le* merges with a perfective AspP with negative feature, it will create a reading that focuses on a non-existent termination of event. That is why sentence-final *le* is banned in (13).

(13) [<sub>FocP</sub> [<sub>AspP</sub> Spec (Zhangsan) Asp (mei-you) [<sub>VP</sub> lai Beijing]] (\*le)].

Zhangsan NEG-YOU come Beijing LE.

Zhangsan has not come to Beijing.

(14) [<sub>TP</sub> Spec (John) T (hasi) [<sub>NegP</sub> Spec (not) (NEG) [<sub>FocP</sub> ti [<sub>AspP</sub> [<sub>VP</sub> come to Beijing]]]]].

However, in the case of (15), the time phrase *san-nian* (three years) is pre-posed above the perfective projection, making it closer to FocP. Instead, the interpretation stresses the time span of the lasting state of *not coming to Beijing*. This shows that unlike *have* in English, sentence-final *le* does not exclusively select perfective aspect, but is a more general focus marker.

(15) [<sub>FocP</sub> [<sub>XP</sub> Spec (Zhangsan) X (san-nian) [<sub>AspP</sub> mei-(you) lai Beijing] le].

Zhangsan three-year NEG-YOU come Beijing LE.

Zhangsan has not come to Beijing for three years.

Overall, this analysis argues for a universal mechanism that forms perfect aspect with focus and perfectiveness. The flexibility in the interpretation of perfect aspect may just come from the flexibility of focus interpretation.

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