Metaphor as Two-way Synecdoche: A Critical Assessment
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Within cognitive linguistics, metaphor is generally analyzed in terms of structural mapping. An alternative account, proposed by Glucksberg and his colleagues (e.g. Glucksberg and Keyser 1990; Glucksberg 2008), is to analyze metaphor as a case of category extension. For example, *shark* in (1) is understood as referring to the generalized SHARK, i.e. a larger class of organisms that are vicious, aggressive, merciless, etc. (Glucksberg 2008: 71). Then *my lawyer* is taken to be an instance of this extended ad-hoc category.

(1) My lawyer is a shark.

Following traditional rhetoric, these operations may be labeled "two-way synecdoche" (Group μ 1970). The purpose of this paper is to critically reexamine this theory (cf. Mori 2006 for insightful discussion), focusing on event structure metaphors (see for example Lakoff 1990).

First, consider the following example involving the metaphor EVENTS ARE ACTIONS, which is responsible for encoding *winter* as the agent of the sentence.

(2) Winter kept us immobile.

Here, the two-way synecdoche theory would assert that a new category is created from ACTION through the elimination of some of its attributes. In (1), even though attributes such as 'can swim', 'has fins', 'has gills', etc. are left out, sufficiently rich attributes remain. However, if we attempt to create a generalized category from the concept of ACTION, for example by leaving out the AGENT component, the resulting category would be rather vacuous and no relevant attribute will remain which would enable a metaphorical characterization of EVENT. A more adequate analysis is to assume that one understands (2) by (fictively) superimposing the AGENT component of the image schema of ACTION on the EVENT category.

Second, the following examples involve the generic-level metaphor TIME IS SPACE. More specifically, (3) is an instantiation of EXPECTED PROGRESS IS A TRAVEL SCHEDULE, and (4) is an instantiation of TIME IS A MOVING OBJECT.

(3) We are behind the schedule.
(4) The judgment day is coming soon.

In (1), since there remain certain attributes which make up the generalized SHARK after the elimination of some, the sentence may be seen as an instance of loose talk. But for event structure metaphors such as TIME IS SPACE, a loose talk interpretation is not plausible. This intuition is in part supported by the difficulty of using hedging expressions with (3) and (4).

(1') My lawyer is a kind of shark.
(3') We are kind of behind the schedule.
(4') The judgment day is sort of coming soon.

(1") Loosely speaking, my lawyer is a shark.
(3") ?Loosely speaking, we are behind the schedule.
(4") ?Loosely speaking, the judgment day is coming soon.

While (3')-(4') and (3")-(4") are barely acceptable, the hedging expressions are not applied to the plausibility of the metaphorical comparison per se as in (1') and (1"), but to the correctness of the assertions being made.

An interesting point that emerges from this analysis is that, contrary to the statement of Gentner and Bowdle (2008: 117) "if the *same abstraction is derived repeatedly* in the context of the base, it may become conventionally associated with that term and may eventually lexicalized as a secondary meaning of the base term" (emphasis added), the event structure metaphors, especially most fundamental ones, are an abstraction from the outset and consequently the basis for comparison is difficult to find.

From the above discussions, two conclusions can be drawn. First, the two-way synecdoche theory can be applied most successfully to cases that involve relatively concrete objects with rich enough attributes, leaving room for loose talk. Event structure metaphors that involve highly general and abstract concepts are not amenable to this analysis. Second, the experiential grounding for event structures should be sought in the embodied synchronization of two domains (for example TIME and SPACE) in the real world, as has been argued by conceptual metaphor theorists (Lakoff 1990; Grady 1997), rather than in the comparison and extraction of attributes.

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