To move or not to move:
Some consequences of a logical analysis of the English auxiliary system

Yusuke Kubota
NINJAL

Just as the transformational analysis of auxiliary inversion and affix hopping (Chomsky 1957) was once thought to be one of the most convincing arguments for the notion of syntactic transformation, a movement-free analysis of auxiliaries whose essence is embodied in the early GPSG analysis by Gazdar et al. (1982) has been taken in the literature of nontransformational syntactic theories to be one of the most successful demonstrations for the viability of movement-free syntax. The consensus in the field (in both the transformationalist and nontransformationalist camps) seems to be that the mainstream syntax which has employed some version of 'syntactic transformation' in all of its avatars and the so-called nontransformational variants of syntax (such as HPSG, LFG, Sign-Based Construction Grammar and categorial grammar) which all disavow syntactic transformation are mutually incompatible alternatives. To what extent is this common wisdom true? If the two are mutually incompatible, which one is closer to the truth?

This talk addresses this question from a somewhat unusual (and potentially controversial) angle. A version of categorial grammar called Hybrid Type-Logical Grammar (Hybrid TLG; Kubota & Levine 2020) turns out to have properties similar to both transformational and nontransformational variants of syntax. An analysis of English auxiliaries in Hybrid TLG turns out to have properties similar to both the transformational and nontransformational analyses. Moreover, it can be formally proven (in the technical sense of 'prove') that the traditional 'VP/VP analysis' of auxiliaries in nontransformational syntax is a *theorem* of a more abstract analysis which embodies the core insight of the transformational analysis. A number of interesting consequences follow, including a conceptually simple analysis of '*do* insertion' that is different from both the transformational and nontransformational analyses. The overall considerations seem to lead us to the conclusion that both transformational syntax and nontransformational syntax were right and both were wrong, and, more importantly, that we need logic to really make sense of the deeper properties underlying the structure-building component of language which linguists usually call 'syntax'.

Remarks on the Partial Pronominal Use of Proverbs in English and the "Simulation Effects" of Generic Pronouns and Clausal Generic Expressions

Koichi Nishida (Yamaguchi Prefectural University)

As is commonly observed (cf. Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998), Huang (2000)), in logophoric complements like (1), pronouns, but not definite noun phrases like epithets or descriptions, can corefer with the matrix subject (where i stands for corefence):

(1) John$_i$ thinks that {he$_i$/*the idiot$_i$/*the senior office worker$_i$} will win.

However, like pronouns, proverbs with noun phrase subjects may occur in such complements and their subjects are taken to corefer with the matrix subject, as in (2):

(2) For more than 20 years, John has woken up at 4:30 every morning and has started working in his office from 7:00. He$_i$ believes that the early bird$_i$ catches the worm.

Proverbs of this type are similar to generic indefinite pronouns like *one*. Moltmann (2006) observes that in (3), the complement with *one* is fine as a general statement if John alone can, but doesn't have to, see the picture from the entrance, but the one with *people* requires that people other than John also can see it from the entrance:

(3) John found out that {one/people} can see the picture from the entrance.

Moltmann (2006: 265) argues that generic *one* accompanies "inference from the first-person," which "is licensed in a (simple) sentence establishing a generalization based on a first-person application of the predicate." Sentence (3) is fine even if John himself is unable to see the picture, because he can simulate anyone with normal vision.

The first-person simulation also comes into play with generic indefinite singulars like those in (4), where *a Christian* is better than *Christians*, and *the Christian* is unacceptable in the reading in which the complement is a matter of Jack himself:

(4) Living in a small house himself, Jack Sanders believes that {a Christian/ Christians/*the Christian} should live a humble life.

Nunberg and Pan (1975) argue that indefinite singulars can be used as generic expressions only in the sentences whose predicates express the properties that the subject individual has through its class-membership; by contrast, bare plurals and definites can make generic sentences that express properties of the class as a whole.

Thus, in (4), the individual in matrix subject, i.e. J. Sanders, can easily simulate the individual in the complement and take it as a matter of himself when the latter is expressed as an individual having the same class-membership properties as him.

Proverbs are closer to generic *one* and indefinite singulars than generic definites in accepting the first-person simulation, but their required indefiniteness does not come from their forms. Rather, it comes from the fact that they lack what Goffman (1981) calls "Author" in their production format; since they are free from authorship, any speaker can apply them to anyone in any similar situation, as specified in (5):

(5) Without authorship, any speaker has to copy proverbs to talk about anyone alike, as in anyone seen as "the early bird" catches the worm or its equivalent(s).

In (5), *anyone* invites the generic reading, which then invites the first-person simulation. The indefinite production format qualifies proverbs as clausal generic expressions.

Because the first-person simulation of proverbs belongs to pragmatic inference rather than to grammar, it also works for proverbs preceded by other determiners, as in "I don't fight that because I_i believe that every dog_i has its day" (Howard (2007) *Women as Hamlet*). The pronominal use of proverbs builds on the simulation of individuals in matrix subject; it disappears if they do not simulate anyone, as in (6):

(6) For more than 20 years, John's father woke up at 4:30 every morning and started working in his office from 7:00. However, he went into bankruptcy at the age of 55. So, today John doesn't believe that the early bird catches the worm.

In (6), the embedded proverb under the negated matrix clause remains a matter of anyone. The simulation effects on the production format in (5) link proverbs with salient discourse referents that are unrelated to their literal meanings (cf. Barajas (2010)).

References

Barajas, E. Domínguez (2010) *The Function of Proverbs in Discourse: The Case of a Mexican Transnational Social Network*, De Gruyter Mouton, New York.

Dubinsky, Stanley and Robert Hamilton (1998) "Epithets as Antilogophoric Pronouns," Linguistic Inquiry 29, 685-693.

Goffman, Erving (1981) *Forms of Talk*, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia.

Huang, Yan (2000) *Anaphora: A Cross-Linguistic Approach*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Moltmann, Friederike (2006) "Generic *One*, Arbitrary Pro, and the First Person," *Natural Language Semantics* 13, 257-281.

Nunberg, Geoffrey and Chiahua Pan (1975) "Inferring Quantification in Generic Sentences," *CLS* 11, 412-422.

Metonymy in Grammar Revisited

Yoshiki Nishimura
University of Tokyo

In a series of publications and presentations (e.g. Nishimura 2002, 2003, 2008), I have proposed a characterization of metonymy that, to my mind, is sufficiently unified and comprehensive to allow us to (1) deal with the widest range of metonymic phenomena, (2) explain why metonymy should be as pervasive in language as most cognitive linguists would like to think it is, and (3) show that a broad array of grammatical phenomena, many of which have traditionally been treated separately, can appropriately be seen as grounded in metonymy. For the benefit of those of you who are not familiar with my work on metonymy, here is how I have characterized it: Metonymy can be defined as occurring when different uses of a given expression, while activating a single shared frame, highlight different facets of that frame.

I will begin this presentation with a quick review of points (1) and (2) above. While I am at it, I will also try to set the record straight about the fate of metonymy in the network model for polysemy (in fact, for much else in language as well) put forward by Langacker many years ago. As far as this country is concerned, many, perhaps the great majority of cognitive linguists seem to believe that this model, at least as it was originally conceived, is inherently not equipped to accommodate metonymy. I will show, by documentation, that nothing could be further from the truth. I will then go on to walk you through my analyses of a couple of grammatical phenomena, most of which are revised versions of the ones presented in my previous work. Among the phenomena to be discussed are the *tough* construction (e.g. *Mary is hard to convince*), the English resultative (e.g. *Bill ate himself sick*), and the Japanese indirect passive (e.g. *Taro-wa Hanako-ni nakareta* 'Taro was adversely affected by Hanako's crying' [Lit. Taro was cried by Hanako]). Taken together, these analyses will hopefully help to convince you of the coherence and potential significance of Cognitive Grammar, which maintains that grammar is inherently meaningful, adopts a usage-based approach to linguistic knowledge, views lexicon and grammar as forming a continuum, and takes linguistic semantics to be encyclopedic in scope.